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Introduction
Resumen
Mi tesis doctoral consta de tres cap´ıtulos: Reputation with En-
dogenous Monitoring, Strategic Communication in Networked Orga-
nizations y Information Technology, Decision Making and Incentives.
En ellos utilizo diferentes herramientas de la Teor´ıa Microecono´mica
para entender co´mo las empresas, organizaciones u otras instititu-
ciones ajenas al mercado agregan la informacio´n obtenida por sus
miembros en su toma de decisiones.
En el primer cap´ıtulo, Reputation with Endogenous Monitoring, es-
tudio la interaccio´n estrate´gica entre un individuo que debe tomar
decisiones y un experto que posee la informacio´n relevante. El ex-
perto puede tener preferencias distintas que las del decisor (y esto es
su informacio´n privada) y sus recomendaciones son estrate´gicas. Por
su parte, el decisor puede verificar la recomendacio´n del agente pero
esto es costoso para e´l. Asumiendo que ambas partes interactu´an
repetidamente, analizo los incentivos que tiene el decisor para veri-
ficar la recomendacio´n del agente dependiendo de su horizonte tem-
poral. Muestro que si el decisor es paciente y esta´ suficientemente
seguro que el agente tiene distintas preferencias que e´l, verificara´
con menor probabilidad en cualquier equilibrio de Markov que en el
caso en que es absolutamente impaciente. Adema´s como al decisor
paciente le gustar´ıa comprometerse a verificar con mayor probabili-
dad de la que resulta del equilibrio, esta´ dispuesto (en algunos casos)
a delegar la decisio´n en uno impaciente. Finalmente, relaciono estos
hallazgos teo´ricos con evidencia emp´ırica obtenida en diversas rela-
ciones bancarias.
En el segundo cap´ıtulo, Strategic Communication in Networked Or-
ganizations analizo organizaciones compuestas por un nu´mero arbi-
trario (finito) de individuos que deben tomar una decisio´n. Su pago
depende de su nivel de coordinacio´n y de la realizacio´n de una vari-
able aleatoria sobre la que solamente tienen una sen˜al imperfecta.
Mi contribucio´n es que les permito enviar mensajes a otros individ-
uos antes de tomar la decisio´n. En concreto, cada individuo puede
comunicarse con un nu´mero determinado de ”vecinos” con los que
esta´ unido en la red. Muestro que la necesidad de coordinacio´n y el
uso de informacio´n imperfecta genera problemas en la comunicacio´n
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excepto en el caso que las redes generen una distribucio´n de la infor-
macio´n igualitaria (por ejemplo, redes ”regulares” en las que todos
los individuos tienen el mismo nu´mero de vecinos). En otro caso,
la comunicacio´n an˜adira´ ruido a la informacio´n y la organizacio´n no
podra´ coordinarse eficientemente. Muestro que estas redes iguali-
tarias pueden ser ”redes de equilibrio” si permitimos a los individuos
decidir cua´nta informacio´n adquiren y que los resultados cualitativos
pueden extenderse al caso en que la comunicacio´n se produce en
rondas sucesivas. La conclusio´n general del art´ıculo es que en or-
ganizaciones en la que la toma de decisiones sea descentralizada,
las jerarqu´ıas y otras redes cuya distribucio´n de informacio´n con de-
sigualdad producen sesgos y ruido en la comunicacio´n e ineficiencia
en la toma de decisiones. Este resultado es notablemente distinto del
obtenido por modelos de organizaciones en las que la comunicacio´n
es no estrate´gica.
Por u´ltimo, en el tercer cap´ıtulo, Information Technology, Decision
Making and Incentives analizo el funcionamiento de una organizacio´n
compuesta por mu´ltiples unidades locales (o individuos) relacionados
a trave´s de una unidad central. La unidad central toma una decisio´n
comu´n para todas, dependiendo de la informacio´n recogida y trans-
mitida por cada unidad. La transmisio´n de informacio´n se realiza me-
diante la una sen˜al costosa en forma de esfuerzo. En este contexto,
determino la estructura o´ptima de informacio´n que la unidad central
obtiene sobre el comportamiento de las unidades locales para tomar
decisiones acertadas y encauzar correctamente sus esfuerzos. En-
cuentro que la cantidad de informacio´n que la unidad central quiere
adquirir dependera´ del grado de volatilidad del entorno y de la im-
portancia de coordinacio´n, pero que nunca deseara´ observar perfec-
tamente las acciones realizadas por las unidades locales. Finalmente,
relaciono estos resultados teo´ricos con la forma organizativa y la in-
versio´n en tecnolog´ıas de la informacio´n realizada en diversas empre-
sas.
Summary
My Ph.D. thesis contains three Chapters: Reputation with Endoge-
nous Monitoring, Strategic Communication in Networked Organiza-
tions and Information Technology, Decision Making and Incentives. In
each of them I use different theoretical techniques to understand how
firms, organizations and other institutions aggregate the information
acquired by their member in order to make appropriate decisions.
In the first Chapter, Reputation with Endogenous Monitoring, I ana-
lyze the strategic interaction between an uninformed decision-maker
and an informed expert. The expert may have a conflict of inter-
est with the decision-maker, but this is his private information. The
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decision-maker is allowed to verify the recommendation of the ex-
pert, but this is costly. Assuming that these two individuals interact
repeatedly over time, I study the incentives of the decision-maker to
verify the recommendation depending on her time horizon. I show
that if the decision-maker is patient and sufficiently pessimistic about
the preferences of the agent, she will verify with less probability in
any Markov Perfect Equilibrium as compared with the case in which
she is myopic. I also show that, due to a lack of commitment, the
principal could increase his payoff by delegating to a myopic one.
Finally, I relate this theoretical findings with the empirical evidence
from the banking industry.
In the second Chapter, Strategic Communication in Networked Or-
ganizations I analyze organizations comprised of a finite number of
individuals, each of whom must take a single decision. Their payoff
depends both on their coordination and on the realization of a ran-
dom variable over which they only observe a noisy signal. I allow
them to send messages to other individuals through an undirected
network. I show that the need for coordination and the use of partial
information difficulties communication even if there is no intrinsic
conflict in preferences. I characterize the set of networks that guar-
antee efficient information transmission, and show that they imply
that the ex-post distribution of information is very equal. Otherwise,
the communication process will add noise and hamper the quality
of the decisions made and the degree of coordination across individ-
uals. I also show that, under some conditions, these networks can
be rationalized as the outcome of a (larger) game in which the indi-
viduals do also decide how much information to acquire. The main
insight of the paper is that in organizations relying on decentralized
decision-making hierarchies and other networks generating unequal
information distributions create biases and noises in communication,
and therefore, inefficiencies in decision making. This result is in sharp
contrast with the literature on non-strategic communication in orga-
nizations.
Finally, in the third Chapter, Information Technology, Decision Mak-
ing and Incentives I study the behavior of a multi-unit organization
where the Headquarters must take a common decision, based on the
information transmitted by each unit. The information transmission
process takes the form of a signalling game. I analyze the optimal in-
formation structure that the Headquarters would choose in order to
balance the trade-off between improved decisions from better infor-
mation and worse incentives. I show that this information structure
will depend on the volatility of the environment and the need for co-
ordination, but it will never be the case that the Headquarters want
to know perfectly the amount of effort that each local unit makes.
I relate these findings to the organizational form and the empirical
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evidence on the value of the investments in Information and Commu-
nication Technologies.
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CHAPTER 1
Reputation with Endogenous Monitoring
’It is with love as with cuckoldom’—the suffering
party is at least the third, but generally the last who
knows anything about the matter.’ Sterne, Tristram
Shandy
1.1. Introduction
Many economic organizations rely on the long-run concerns of
their members to sustain cooperation and reduce the impact of oppor-
tunism. Firms may outperform anonymous markets whenever con-
tract enforcement is difficult or costly, since they can identify those
who take inefficient actions1. For instance, in environments with ad-
verse selection, patient players may be able to build a reputation by
mimicking the behavior of cooperative types or by signaling away
from defectors 2. They trade-off short-run gains against future losses
that occur whenever their partners identify their behavior as bad, and
get to expect this bad behavior to be maintained in the future.
Therefore, for reputations to emerge, playing partners must be
able to identify bad behavior, and the performance of the organization
is effectively determined by its monitoring technology. Accordingly,
the literature has devoted most of its attention to the identification
of conditions in the information structure that result in efficient out-
comes. This information structure is, however, taken to be exogenous
and independent of the behavior of the individuals. Casual empiri-
cism, however, suggests that in many cases performance measures are
not readily observable and costly resources must be devoted to iden-
tify potential misbehavior. Therefore, incentives must be in place for
players to monitor intensively their partners, identify and deter de-
fectors. In this paper, I am interested in such situations and analyze
the impact of this assumption on the outcomes of the interaction3.
1An excellent review is presented in Mailath and Samuelson (2006)
2Seminal contributions are Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts
(1982), where a firm may be able to credibly threat to predate entrants. Benabou
and Laroque (1992) study a model in which a financial advisor is able to convey
information credibly. Bar-Isaac (2003) studies a market equilibrium with firms
providing high quality, even if this is unverifiable.
3To the best of my knowledge there are only two papers with endogenous moni-
toring in infinite-horizon games. Liu (2011) studies a dynamic game with short-run
1
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More specifically, I study a very simple, infinite-horizon game be-
tween two patient players. In each period, one of the players (the
principal) has to choose between two alternatives. The principal is
ex-ante indifferent between them. However, his payoff of choosing
each alternative depends upon the realization of the state of nature,
which is drawn anew in every period. The principal is uninformed
about this realization but has access to the report of an agent who
has some information regarding this realization. The agent’s inter-
ests, however, may be misaligned with those of the principal and this
is his private information. A good agent is ”committed” to telling the
truth every period, while a bad agent is strategic and biased towards
one alternative. The principal may verify the report of the agent by
paying some positive cost.
I concentrate the analysis on stationary Markov Perfect Equilib-
ria (MPE) where each player’s strategy is a measurable function of
payoff-relevant components of the history. I show that whenever the
principal is sufficiently pessimistic about the type of the agent, in
any MPE of the infinite-horizon game she monitors less often and
the agent lies more often if the principal is a long-run player (com-
pared with a situation where the principal is myopic). The intuition
is simple. The strategic type of the agent has incentives to build a
reputation for being truthful, in order to get his preferred decision
more often in the future. This reputation is constructed by mimicking
a truthful, non-strategic type. Reputation is valuable for the princi-
pal since it improves the informativeness of the report and saves on
monitoring costs. However monitoring is also costly because it may
bring bad news, i.e., the agent may be revealed to be strategic and
continuation equilibrium yields lower value to the principal. This im-
plies that for a patient principal monitoring intensity becomes lower
and, consequently, the strategic type lies more often in equilibrium.
I argue that these effects may be present in a wide variety of eco-
nomic interactions, where a combination of adverse selection and
moral hazard is present. In those environments, monitoring is a fun-
damental economic activity and the incentives to undertake it cru-
cially depend on the time-horizon of the relationship. According to
the conventional view, in a long-term relationship, agents will acquire
more information since they can use it in the future4. However, mon-
itoring not only yields information but changes the nature of the re-
lationship and constraints the behavior of the monitored agent. This,
in turn, may affect the incentives to monitor and the value of the re-
lationship. Hence, by reducing the effort in monitoring activities, a
buyers who may acquire information about previous trades of a seller. Kandori and
Obara (2005) who prove a sort of folk theorem in a repeated game where every
player may devote effort to monitor others.
4See Fama (1985), Diamond (1991)
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patient principal can reduce the risk of discovering a bad type and
losing a valuable relationship5.
For instance, relationship finance is commonly assumed to reduce
conflicts of interest and increase the effort that banks put in monitor-
ing the actions of their borrowers. This is because banks appropriate
the returns of their information in the future and therefore invest
more today in acquiring it. This assumes, however, that those returns
are positive, which may not be the case in the game I present. There-
fore, whenever the mechanism presented in this paper is at work,
banks entering in arm’s length financing may provide more intensive
monitoring than those engaging in relationship finance.
Similar examples abound. Parents may not have the appropriate
incentives to monitor whether their kids do their homework, start
smoking or get into troubles. Married individuals may face similar
problems when monitoring their potentially unfaithful partner. Fi-
nally, supranational authorities may struggle to monitor intensively
countries under their authority. Notice that in all these situations, the
principal has a long-run concern and very limited ability to choose or
replace the agent.
More generally, I argue that this paper provides a rationale for
why fraudulent types survive longer than external observers would
expect in many organizations. As an example consider the case of
double spies. Intelligence Agencies are unsure whether their spies
are double agents and would like to crosscheck their reports. Nev-
ertheless, if every report is required to be checked, the agent is of
no value. Even more, if an agent is known to be a double agent,
he is useless and the agency may not have access to similar agents
or sources of information. Therefore, double agents would survive
longer than expected. This was the case of Juan Pujol, a Spanish spy
working for both UK and Germany. Although, from the point of view
of historical evidence, he had given enough evidence to the Germans
that he was a double agent, they maintained their confidence in his
reports until the very end6.
In each of these situations, long-term incentives for the principal
may fail to yield higher incentives to monitor. Therefore, one would
expect that in organizations where this problem is severe, short-run
incentives are used to encourage information acquisition. Indeed this
is the case in the case analyzed in a recent contribution (Hertzberg
et al. (2010)). They document agency problems related with the
time-horizon of relationships between the loan-officer of a bank and
the borrowing firm. They show that, whenever the relationship of a
5See Subsection 1.4 for a discussion on the assumptions required for the result.
6Indeed, Juan Pujol was key in the cover up of the D-Day. More information
about him is to be found in Andrew (2009)
4 1. REPUTATION
given officer with a firm is about to end, the officer sends more accu-
rate reports, and these reports are more likely to include bad news.
In order to alleviate these agency problems, the bank has introduced
policies of rapid turnover and task reallocation, and compensation
packages depending on short-term objectives.
This model may also be interpreted as an expert-agent type of
game. The decision-maker is matched with an informed expert and
has a to take a sequence of decisions of unknown length. The decision-
maker may verify the report of the agent but obtains no more feed-
back until the sequence ends. Finally, she cannot decide to substitute
the expert. This feature is the main departure from previous literature
(e.g. Ely and Valimaki (2003)) and can be interpreted in two differ-
ent ways. First, it may be that the agent has been hired prior to this
sequence of decisions and has secure tenure7. Alternatively the agent
works on his own behalf and, therefore, he cannot be fired8. Finally,
my model does also contribute to the (broad) literature on auditing
games. The novelty from this perspective is the fact that the audited
player can build a reputation of being ”honest” and, therefore, affect
subsequent auditing. It highlights the role of the time-horizon for the
auditor under strong incentives.
This chapter contributes to the literature on reputation in dynamic
games of asymmetric information. In particular, it contributes to a
small but important literature that shows the limits of reputation as
a way to restrain the behavior of patient players. The first paper to
identify a shortcoming of the reputation effect is Morris (2001) who
presents a model where an advisor with long-run concerns and no
intrinsic bias against any alternative has an incentive to misreport
his information in order to look ”good”. This incentive results in an
equilibrium without any useful information provision. In a similar
fashion, Ely and Valimaki (2003) study the sequential equilibrium of
a dynamic game where the interaction between reputation and the
interest of the agent to maintain his employment status, leads to no
trade in equilibrium. The no-trade result is originated, as opposed
to my paper, by the fact that the principals are short-lived and there
is an information externality between them. Each of the principals
would like to know whether she is facing a good or a bad agent but
no one has incentives to incur in short-run losses in order to learn it.
This externality is internalized by a long-lived principal who is able
to commit and delegates decision-rights to the agent.
7For instance a newspaper hires a journalist to write a sequence of news pieces.
The veracity of these is uncertain for the journal. Firing the worker is costly and
may yield a reputation loss for the newspaper.
8Newspaper columnists, blogging economists or lobbyists offering advice on
public policy are examples of this
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Notice that in both Ely and Valimaki (2003) and this chapter the
time horizon and patience of the uninformed principal play a key
role in determining the equilibrium. In Ely and Valimaki (2003), in-
formation comes only after trade, so that for a myopic principal such
information is of no use. In my paper, however, monitoring yields
information ex-ante and a myopic principal may therefore have in-
centives to experiment. What is more, I show that, under some con-
ditions, she has more incentives to experiment when she is myopic
than when she is patient.
Another paper that is close to this one is Sobel (1985). He an-
alyzes a similar game but assumes that output is perfectly and im-
mediately observed by the principal and that the agent is perfectly
informed about the state of nature. He concentrates on the condi-
tions for equilibria involving information revelation by the agent at
the beginning of the game. At some point, however, the agent will lie
and the principal will know it for sure. Once this happens the game
ends. Therefore, the goals of his paper are very different from mine.
As mentioned above, I also contribute to a small literature on en-
dogenous information acquisition in games with repeated interaction.
Liu (2011) presents a model with a sequence of short-lived buyers
who have access to a costly technology that allows them to observe
a number of previous trades of the seller. The seller may be a com-
mitment or a strategic type, and buyers acquire a finite number of
observations in equilibrium. The model predicts a cyclical behavior
in reputation, with strategic sellers creating reputation until no buyer
can distinguish them from a commitment type and then ”milking it
down”. In my model past trades are observable and information ac-
quisition concerns current actions. Kandori and Obara (2005) de-
velop a sort of Folk Theorem for games of costly, private monitoring.
Players monitor (audit) other players’ behavior randomly and during
cooperative phases, players both cheat and audit at the same time.
There is, however, no reputation effects since there is no asymmetric
information about players’ types. In any case, my paper is the first to
show that dynamic incentives for information acquisition may fail to
give lead to more effort, in the presence of reputation effects.
More broadly, my results are also related to a branch of the liter-
ature on mechanism design that highlights the benefits of ignorance
and uncertainty in the provision of incentives. Holmstrom (1999)
presents a signal-jamming model in which agents are rewarded de-
pending on the market belief about their ability. Ability and effort are
substitutes, and so there is an incentive to provide more effort when-
ever the market belief is less precise. The main difference is that
in this model ignorance fosters incentives through the expected learn-
ing and the dynamic value of information is always positive, and,
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therefore, the longer the horizon the higher the incentives to acquire
information.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2
I introduce the (infinite horizon) model and analyzes the main trade-
offs in the simple static case. At the end of this Section I present a
discussion of the main assumptions. In Section1.5 I solve the game
played by a long-run agent and a myopic principal. This is the bench-
mark for my main result. In Section 1.6 I analyze the game played
by two patient players. In Section 1.7 I study the role of commitment
for the principal. In Section 1.8, I apply the model to some of the
environments already mentioned. Finally, in Section 1.9 I conclude
the paper.
1.2. The Model
1.2.1. Environment. Consider a game played by two infinitely-
lived players: a principal (she) and an agent (he). The principal has
to make a decision every period dt ∈ D = {a, b}. In order to fix
ideas, you may think of this decision as whether to invest in a given
project. This decision generates a flow payoff that depends on the
realization of the state of the nature ωt ∈ Ω = {A,B}. I assume, for
simplicity, that the ex-ante probability of both events is the same, so
that Pr(ωt = A) = Pr(ωt = B) = 12 . She does not observe the real-
ization of ωt but she has access to a costless report by an agent (he)
who has received has received a costless signal st correlated with the
realization of ωt. I assume a simple, binary structure for the signal,
so that st ∈ {S, F}, where s = S represents the case where the agent
has acquired evidence in favor of alternative A and s = F the case in
which he has not. There is no hard evidence in favor of alternative
B9. I denote by q be the posterior that the agent holds if he has ob-
tained evidence and 1− q the posterior in case he has not, so that q is
the precision of the signal. Finally notice that neither the agent nor
the principal do observe the realization of ωt.
The principal can monitor the agent. By paying a fixed cost c,
the principal verifies his report, requiring the agent to disclose the
evidence he may have. Following with the banking example, the loan
officer may decide to audit the accounts presented by the firm. Notice
that given the asymmetric structure, and the fact that the agent may
be biased in favor of A, the principal will never monitor after a report
recommending B. This simplifies the analysis without affecting the
main trade-offs.
The principal is a self-interested, forward-looking, rational player.
She discounts the future by δ ∈ [0, 1) and maximize their expected
9Under the interpretation of B as no investment and A as investment. While it
is possible to show that a project is profitable, it is very difficult to show that there
does not exist a profitable project.
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discounted stream of utilities. The principal’s per-period utility func-
tion is
vp(d, ω, s) = u(d, ω)− cm
where up(d, ω) = 1 if d = a and ω = A or if d = b and ω = B, and
up(d, ω) = 0 otherwise. Finally cm is the cost of monitoring. If the
principal verifies the signal of the agent m = 1, and if he does not
m = 0.
There are two types of agents. The bad agent does not share the
same preferences over actions than the principal. In particular, the
agent may enjoy a private benefit λ > 0 if action A is implemented.
I will assume throughout that λ > 2q − 1 so that he always prefers
action A independently of the state. On the other hand, if the agent
reports the truth in every period, we say that the agent is good10. The
agent’s type is also his private information and is set fixed through
time. The principal holds an initial prior belief µ0 that the agent
is good. Finally, as in Sobel (1985) assume that the ”importance
of the decision” for the agent varies from period to period, so let
xt ∈ X represent this weight. Assume that X = [xl, xh] is distributed
according to F (x), i.i.d through time, and is private information for
the agent. As a normalization let E [xt] = 1. You may think x as a
device to purify mixed strategies for the agent. Thus, if the agent is
bad, his flow utility is
vA(d, ω) = [u(d, ω) + λ1d=A]x
The following assumption simplify the problem.
ASSUMPTION 1.1. xh(1− 2q + λ) < xlq
Assumption 1 guarantees that no matter how low is the realization
of xt the agent never prefers to recommend decision B when the
signal he has received is S. It is sufficient to simplify both the problem
of the principal and the agent without distorting the main intuitions.
The timing of the stage game is as follows. At the beginning of
the period the principal holds a belief µt ∈ [0, 1] that the agent is
good. The state of nature and the signals are drawn according to their
distributions. The agent sends a report rt ∈ R, the set of admissible
messages11, and the principal decides whether to verify the report or
10We assume that the good agent is a commitment type. It is straightforward
to construct a payoff type choosing the same strategy. The complication is with
respect to beliefs off-the-equilibrium path, since commitment types never deviate
and payoff types may deviate. For a discussion see Mailath and Samuelson (2006),
Chapter 15
11Since the good type only receives information about the state, if the bad type
pretends to be a good, she may send at most two messages in equilibrium. Thus,
without loss of generality R contains two elements. Hence, I shall assume that
R = Ω
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not (mt ∈ {0, 1}). Finally, the principal chooses dt ∈ Ω and the game
moves to the following period.
1.2.2. Strategies and Equilibrium Concept. The main purpose
of this paper is to analyze the (Stationary) Markov-Perfect Equilib-
rium of the infinite-horizon game. This equilibrium concept captures
the idea that players have no commitment power and condition their
strategies only on payoff-relevant information. Define a (private) his-
tory for the agent at the beginning of period t,
hat = {(sk, rk, xk) , (mk, dk)}k<t .
Let Ht be the space of such histories. The bad agent observes the
realization of his private information (st, xt) and decides which report
to send. Therefore, a pure strategy for the agent is
rt : h
a
t × {S, ∅} ×X → Ω.
Recall that the good agent always tells the truth. A public history
when the principal has to decide whether to monitor is
(1.1) hpt = {(rk) , (mk−1, dk−1)}k≤t .
Define Hpt to be the space of such histories. A pure monitoring strat-
egy for the principal
m : hpt → Ω
Stationary Markov strategies map payoff-relevant component of
histories into actions with the constrain that for every two differ-
ent histories ht, h′r generating the same posterior probability that the
agent is good, the equilibrium play is the same. Thus, Markov strate-
gies are measurable with respect to the posterior probability after
every history. In what follows I describe these Markov strategies and
present the concept of Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
The principal has to choose his actions using only payoff-relevant
information. Given that both states are equally likely his choice of dt
is trivial. She will choose dt = a if and only if her posterior belief that
the state ω = A exceeds 1
2
. For this reason, in the following, I will
consider exclusively on the principal’s choice of whether to monitor
or not after a report A. Let σ(µ) ∈ [0, 1] be the monitoring mixed
strategy for a principal who holds a belief µ that the agent is good
and receives a report A.
The bad agent, on the other hand, will misreport his information
whenever it is in his best interest to do so. Thus, let r(x;µ) ∈ {0, 1}
be the probability that a bad agent, who has not received informa-
tion and weights this period with x, and is believed to be good with
probability µ by the principal sends report A.
Denote V k : [0, 1]→ R+ be the value function of the principal who
has received a report k ∈ {A,B} as a function of the current belief.
Similarly, denote U : [0, 1]×{S, F}×X → R+ be the value function of
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the (bad) agent who has obtained a signal st and weights the current
period with value xt and is believed to be good with probability µt.
Let F¯ (y) = 1 − F (y). Define φk(µ; r) for k ∈ {A,B} to be the
posterior probability that the agent is good conditional on a report k
if the prior was µ and the bad agent uses strategy r. With some abuse
of notation I will write
φk(µ) =
∫
φk(µ; r(x;µ))dF (x)
to be the equilibrium posterior probability from the point of view of
the principal. Let pi(µ; r) be the expected payoff for the principal after
a recommendation to choose A of an agent believed to be good with
probability µ who uses strategy r, if the principal is not monitoring.
DEFINITION 1.1. A Markov-Perfect Equilibrium is a pair of Markov
strategies (σ∗, r∗) and a belief µ satisfying;
i) σ∗ > 0, iff
(1.2) q − c+ δEx,r [V (µ′)] ≥ pi (µ; r) + δV (φA(µ))
ii) r = A if and only if
(1.3) 1− q + λ+ δEσ,x [U (µ′)] ≥ q + δE [U (φB(µ))]
iii) µ′ is computed from µ using Bayes Rule12
1.3. Static Game
1.3.1. Known Type. It is useful to begin the analysis looking at
the case in which the principal knows at the outset the type of the
agent13. In this case, if the agent is good, there is no monitoring
and the relationship yields an expected discounted payoff V¯ = q for
both players. On the other hand, if the agent is biased, there is a
continuum of equilibria. Let p∗ be the probability with which the
agent reports A without supporting evidence in every period. This is
the perceived probability of the principal, but the agent may use x as
a randomization device. In every equilibrium, the principal will only
monitor with probability 1 after an A−report whenever
c ≤ p∗
[
q − 1
2
]
and never monitor otherwise. On the other hand, for the agent it is
a (weakly) dominant strategy to report A after failing to obtain any
12From the point of view of the principal, every report of the agent has positive
probability as long as µ ∈ (0, 1). If µ is degenerate, it will remain constant in the
future. Therefore, off-the-equilibrium path beliefs are irrelevant.
13Formally, the type of the agent does also include the collection of realizations
of the uncertainty (x, s). However, for lack of a better word, I will devote the word
type to refer to his preference profile.
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signal since
1− q + λ > q.
Let p0 satisfy
c =
1
2
p0 [2q − 1]
ASSUMPTION 1.2. p0 < 1
The assumption guarantees that monitoring occurs in equilibrium.
A particular class of equilibria that will turn out to be useful are
threshold equilibria. For every x∗ ∈ [xl, F¯−1(p0)] there is an equilib-
rium in which the agent reportsA if x ≥ x∗ and the principal monitors
if A is reported. Each of these equilibria yield the same payoff for the
agent, but not for the principal. To see this, define Vx∗ as the value
for the principal in an equilibrium where the agent uses x∗ as his
threshold strategy.
Vx∗ = q − 1
2
c
[
F¯ (x∗) + 1
]
.
For the remaining of the paper, I shall consider only undominated
strategies (see discussion below). It is obvious that reporting B is
(weakly) dominated for the agent, in the symmetric information game,
so that I set x∗ = xl. Thus, the value for the principal is
V
¯
= q − c
1.3.2. Unknown Type. We consider now the case in which the
principal is uncertain about the type of the agent. Suppose that the
probability she attaches to the event that the agent is good is µ. Then,
she will monitor the agent if and only if µ ≤ µ¯, where µ¯ is defined in
c =
1
2
(1− µ¯) [2q − 1]
and so the principal gets a value
V (µ) = µVg(µ) + (1− µ)Vb(µ)
with Vg(µ) = 12q +
1
2
(q − c) > Vb(µ) = q − c if µ ≤ µ¯ and Vg(µ) = q >
Vb(µ) =
1
2
if µ > µ¯
Finally, the value for the principal of learning the type of the
agent, in this static framework is
Π = µ(V¯ − Vg(µ)) + (1− µ)(V
¯
− Vb(µ))
=
{
1
2
µc if µ ≤ µ¯
(1− µ)(q − 1
2
) if µ > µ¯ ≥ 0
Obviously in this simple game, the principal is willing to pay to know
the type of the agent. In the rest of the paper we show that this
incentives need not be present in the infinite-horizon version of the
model, since information does change the continuation equilibrium.
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1.4. Discussion
Although in a very stylized way, this model is able to capture the
main features of the strategic interactions presented above. Think,
for instance, in the game played by the bank and an entrepreneur.
The entrepreneur may come, every period, with a potentially prof-
itable project. He may also ”save for better times” if there is no prof-
itable project at hand. The bank would like to finance only profitable
projects, but ascertain whether a project is profitable is costly. The
bank would like to use the informational content of the decision of
the entrepreneur to offer a project, in order to save resources from
costly monitoring. This is possible, if the entrepreneur builds a repu-
tation of being ”trustworthy”, by behaving as a ”good” type.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the main feature of the envi-
ronment is that the agent is paired with the principal and there is no
exit option. This assumption may seem restrictive, but I feel that it
captures quite well the environment described. First, in family rela-
tions exit is usually infeasible. Moreover, in those relations that allow
for exit, it is usually very costly since the agent may be very hard
to substitute. Our results would not change if verifiable evidence
of misbehavior is required for dismissing the agent, and would be
qualitatively similar if the principal dismisses the agent whenever his
belief on his type falls below some threshold, since the good agent is
committed to telling the truth and not strategic.
I also assume, in this particular version of the model, that players
do not learn their payoffs as they play. All results will go through as
long as output is not perfectly observed (or q < 1) since information
about payoffs is received after decisions are made. This information
does not change the updating of interim beliefs, and, therefore, is
irrelevant when analyzing the strategic interaction between the agent
and the principal. The limiting case in which output is immediately
and perfectly observed and q = 1 is analyzed in Sobel (1985)14.
Finally, I assume that stage-game payoffs are independent of the
current belief that the market has. This is a simplification, and it is
unlikely to hold in real-world examples. It requires, for instance, that,
a priori, both alternatives are equally likely and that the importance
of the period xt is distributed independently of the reputation of the
agent. Removing any of these restrictions will not affect the results,
as long as the stage-game payoff of the agent is monotonically in-
creasing in the belief that the principal holds about his type. This is
satisfied in all the examples introduced. For instance, in the credit
market example, interest rates will be decreasing in the belief that
14Details of this extension are presented in a Supplemental Appendix to Garcia-
Gonzalez (2012).
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the lender has about the agent’s type and, therefore, the payoff of the
agent would be increasing in this belief.
1.4.1. Solution Concept. In the remaining of the paper I focus
on undominated equilibria. In particular, I rule out weakly dom-
inated strategies in subgames that involve perfect information and
monitoring with probability one. Notice that these equilibria rely on
dominated strategies for the agent but are weakly preferred for the
principal. Alternatively, I could have assumed that the monitoring
technology fails to give any information with some positive, albeit
small, probability. Undominated equilibria will be the only equilib-
ria surviving in such perturbed model. In this sense, the equilibria
I look at is the limit with respect to a class of imperfect monitoring
technologies, while the rest are not.
I also restrict attention to Markov strategies. I believe that Markov
strategies are the natural way to introduce lack of commitment and
impose sequential rationality in infinitely-lived relations. Notice that
a strategy is Markov if it is only measurable with respect to payoff-
relevant information in every period in time, so that for every two
histories originating the same beliefs Markovian strategies specify the
same distribution over actions. In particular, the principal is unable to
commit to future punishments conditional on deviations that do not
trigger a change in his beliefs about the type of the agent. This kind of
punishments require players to coordinate either through correlating
devices or their history, which may be difficult in many situations of
interest. Notice that my aim in this paper is to compare the situation
where both the agent and the principal are long-run players with
one in which the principal is short-run. Equilibria involving future
punishments and rewards renders the comparison between the two
environments difficult.
Markov Perfect Equilibria are formed by simple strategies. This
simple structure is well-suited for studying interactions within or-
ganizations, where decision-making follows standardized protocols
and routines requiring the use of limited information. Organizations
tradeoff the benefits of more accurate decision-making versus the
costs of information transmission and acquisition (Arrow (1974)).
Therefore, strategies requiring infinite recall and the use of unbounded
information are not useful for understanding the equilibrium behav-
ior of real-world organizations.
1.4.2. Monitoring Technology. I assume that monitoring is both
public and perfect. This means that the agent knows for certain
whether the principal has verified his report and the result of such
verification. This assumption is justified in many of the environments
described above, e.g. relationship finance, where the agent is asked
to disclose his information.
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The assumption is made mainly for the sake of simplicity. First, if
monitoring were private but perfect, the state would not only include
the current belief of the principal but also, the second-order belief of
the agent. In general, this second-order belief is distribution over the
set of possible beliefs that the principal may have (depending on her
past actions). In my simple model, however, the principal is not will-
ing to distort her decision in order to conceal her information, since
the very reason to monitor is to make better decisions. Therefore, the
second-order belief will be degenerate and no additional insights will
be obtained.
Second, one could assume that the monitoring technology is im-
perfect, in the sense, that it yields no information with some positive
probability. This is the technology used in Diamond (1991) among
others. My results are robust to this extension and, moreover, our
equilibrium selection criterion picks the limit equilibria of the class
of games indexed by these technologies where the probability of fail-
ure goes to zero. But allowing monitoring to be both imperfect and
private would affect the results non-trivially and is left for future re-
search.
1.5. Myopic Principal
I will present now the results for the benchmark model where the
principal is myopic while the agent is patient and discount the future
with a factor δ. The strategic agent maximizes, then, the present
expected discounted sum of his stream of payoffs. After the agent
observes his signal st and the importance of the period xt, his value
function is
U(µ;xt, st) = max
r
xEσ [vA(d, s) | r] + δEx,σ (U(µ) | r)
with
U(µ) =
1
2
∫
[U(µ;x, a) + U(µ;x, b)] dF (x)
where the agent takes expectations over the (mixed) strategy of the
principal and the future realizations of the uncertainty. The principal
will never monitor with probability 1 since in that case the agent
will not be lying with positive probability. On the other hand, if the
agent plays a threshold strategy x15, the principal will randomize, and
monitor with positive probability only if
c = (1− µ)F¯ (x∗)(2q − 1)
This determines x as part of the equilibrium for those µ such that
σ(µ) > 0. Call xs(µ) the solution to the equation (in case it exists).
15In the long-run case, every equilibrium is outcome equivalent to a threshold
equilibrium.
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We need to find σ ∈ (0, 1) to make xs(µ) optimal
[xs(µ)(1− q + λ) + U(φA(µ))] (1−σ)+σ [qxs(µ) + U(0)] = qxs(µ)+U(φB(µ))
The following Proposition summarizes this equilibrium 16.
PROPOSITION 1.2. In any equilibrium of the game with one long-
run player, the principal monitors with positive probability if and only
if µ is small enough, the agent lies with positive probability for every µ.
The (strategic) agent is discovered in finite time.
The typical play is as follows. If the principal is confident that the
agent is good, she does not monitor and the agent fully chooses the
future path of posterior beliefs. In this case, he restraints his behavior
because if the belief goes down, the principal will monitor and thus
his influence in the decision will be lower. If the agent is bad, beliefs
will follow a stochastic path with negative drift and, at some point,
the principal starts to monitor with positive probability. In this case,
the agent’s payoff from suggesting option A is decreased but he still
lies with positive probability, until he is discovered. Importantly, the
agent does always restraint his behavior as compared with the one-
shot interaction case if µ ∈ (0, 1), in the sense that he cooperates and
tells the truth with positive probability. This increases the equilibrium
payoff of the principal. Finally, notice that this allows the principal
to reduce his monitoring (if the agent chooses B the principal does
not bear the cost of monitoring). This is the key observation for what
follows.
1.6. Patient Principal
The problem for the agent is similar than the one presented above,
given that he takes σ as given. The problem of the principal changes
in two dimensions. First, the principal now has an incentive to learn
the information of the agent to make better decisions and thus in-
creases his sustained payoff. But second, he faces a dynamic incon-
sistency problem that will lead him to reduce the speed of learning
and thus, the reputational concern of the agent. Characterizing this
second force is the main aim of this paper.
Whenever the agent chooses action A, the principal can choose
between verifying his signal or not. If he does, his future discounted
expected payoff is
VA,1(µ) = q − c+ δ
[
(1− µ) F¯ (x(µ))V (0) + (µ+ F (x(µ)(1− µ))V (µ)]
while if he does not verify
VA,0(µ) = piµ + δV (φA(µ))
16If the Principal is short-lived Existence of Stationary MPE can be shown using
slight modifications of the results in Bar-Isaac (2003)
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Notice that the principal randomizes if and only if
VA,1(µ) = VA,0(µ)
In Appendix A, I show that both V and U as well as the policy
functions are monotone. Thus, minor modifications of well-known
arguments guarantee equilibrium existence. I am now ready to state
the main result of this Chapter. Namely, that in any MPE the patient
principal will reduce his monitoring intensity at some beliefs.
PROPOSITION 1.3. In any equilibrium of the game in which both the
principal and the agent are long-run players, there exists some µl > 0,
such that if µt < µl, xs(µt) > xl(µt) and σs (µt) > σl (µt)
To see this result, consider the value function as a weighted aver-
age of the two conditional value functions V (µ | t) for t ∈ {g, b}. It
is clear that V (µ) = µV (µ | g) + (1 − µ)V (µ | b) where µ defines the
equilibrium strategies and the type determines the payoffs. Notice
that the martingale property of the beliefs is such that the dynamic
value of information is pinned down by a weighted average of the
change in those two value functions as information arrives. In par-
ticular V (µ | g) is decreasing in µ since monitoring is redundant in
this case, and takes the value q
1−δ for all µ such that σ (µ) = 0. How-
ever, V (µ | b) is not maximized at µ = 0 since the reputation effect
is absent. In particular, V (µ | b) is bounded away from its supremum
at µ = 0. Intuitively, if the principal is indifferent of whether to mon-
itor or not, conditional on receiving a report recommending action
A, the informativeness of such report must be bounded away from
zero. Therefore, as the belief goes to zero, the probability of a lie
must remain bounded away from 1. This implies that the value for
the principal of maintaining uncertainty on the agent’s type is strictly
positive for every µ and the result follows.
The following proposition shows that this may increase the value
for the agent for every µ ∈ (0, 1)
PROPOSITION 1.4. There exists some c1 > 0 such that if c ≥ c1 then
the agent lies with higher probability when matched with a long-run
principal (xs(µ) ≥ xl(µ)) and gets a higher payoff, U l(µ) ≥ U s(µ), for
every µ ∈ (0, 1)
As mentioned above, these are the main results of the paper and
show how a principal facing an agent who is likely to have conflicting
interests with himself, faces a trade-off when deciding whether to in-
vestigate him. Absent any dynamic concerns, she may find it optimal
to monitor him closely, in order to avoid being cheated, but whenever
she has a long-term concern, she will reduce her monitoring intensity
and try to free-ride on the dynamic concern of the agent. This will in
its turn lead to a lower incentive for the agent to restrain his behavior
and thus lower payoffs for the principal.
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1.7. The Role of Commitment
In this Section I explore commitment or the principal. I will first
allow the principal to commit at the beginning of the period to a mon-
itoring intensity. This implies that the principal need not be indiffer-
ent whether to monitor or not conditional on a report recommending
A and that she internalizes the effect of a higher monitoring intensity
in the behavior of the principal. In short, the principal becomes the
Stackleberg leader. Her problem becomes
V C(µ) = max
σ∈[0,1]
pµ (σ) q+(1−pµ (σ)) [σ(q − c) + (1− σ)piµ (σ)]+δE V C(φ (µ))
where pµ (σ) is the expected probability of a report B when the belief
is µ and the principal committed to a strategy σ. Notice that V C(φ (µ))
may be not differentiable. However, it is easy to see that the maxi-
mization problem is globally concave17. The following proposition
shows that the solution to this problem σC (µ) ≥ σl(µ) for every µ.
PROPOSITION 1.5. If the principal has long-run concerns and is able
to commit to a monitoring strategy before the agent reports, she will
monitor with higher probability than in the case in which she cannot
commit.
The proof uses the fact that at σl(µ) the principal is ex-post in-
different between monitoring or not, but ex-ante has an incentive to
increase monitor to lead to a higher accuracy of the report and save
on monitoring costs. Therefore, if σl(µ) > 0, σC (µ) > σl(µ). Finally
notice that this implies that whenever σS(µ) ≥ σl(µ) the principal
may find it useful to delegate monitoring to a third party and give
him short-term incentives.
The preceding discussion suggests that there is a role to commit-
ment. But, can a principal who fully commits to a monitoring inten-
sity get his first-best payoff? Ely and Valimaki (2003) show that in an
environment similar to ours, if the principal is a long-run player and
can choose a (stochastic) participation-rule as a function of the entire
history, social first-best is attainable (under the average discounted
expected payoff criterion). The idea of their mechanism is to ”pro-
mote” the agent after every period with positive probability, so that
monitoring stops altogether. The probability is chosen to separate
types, so that a bad type is not willing to incur in the cost of mimick-
ing the good type and prefers to deviate in the first period. For this
result, it is required that deviating today yields high payoffs for the
bad type. In particular, the decision-rule today must follow his advice
-although this advice is also known to be wrong.
17Informally, increasing σ reduces both the probability of a report A but also
the difference in continuation values (less informative signals.)
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In my model, unlike in Ely and Valimaki (2003), however, the de-
cision is made by the principal. This implies that if the agent expects
the principal to verify his report with high enough probability, the
agent will pretend he is a good type and tell the truth. Hence, the
principal will be unable to tell them apart fast enough and fail to get
her first-best payoff. To understand the result, let V i : H → R be the
value that the principal can get after a given history h ∈ H where she
to play against a type i ∈ {g, b}, and let µ(h) be the implied belief of
the principal.
PROPOSITION 1.6. For every µ(h) ∈ (0, 1), if V g(h) = q
1−δ then
V b(h) < q−c
1−δ .
The argument is simple. Since the bad agent may pretend to be a
good type, in order to give incentives for revelation the principal must
give him higher continuation payoff. But absent any commitment
to follow the advice, the principal can only give higher payoffs by
reducing her monitoring intensity. Lower monitoring implies delay in
information and more cheating, so that her payoff is bounded away
from first best. On the other hand, if she were to monitor more, her
payoff on the good agent will be lower since monitoring is inefficient
in such a case.
As it is clear from the proof the incentive compatibility constraint
of the agent is binding and this implies that revelation will be slow
enough for the principal to obtain his first best value. If the principal
could commit also to delegate the decision to the agent, this would
soften this constraint and increase the value of the principal. Thus,
an important insight of this paper is that delegating monitoring and
decision-making may be superior to delegating monitoring and rely-
ing on communication.
1.8. Applications
Organizational Design: As mentioned in the Introduction, this
paper offers novel insights about the use of different institutions in
many organizations. First, we provide a new rationale for delegated
monitoring. In the framework presented her, monitoring is not only
required to provide incentives but also to acquire information about
the type of the agent. The value of such information is not always pos-
itive, since it reduces future incentives. Therefore, delegating moni-
toring to a third party who does not internalize this negative value of
information may increase monitoring and provide better incentives
now.
Second, we provide an intuitive explanation for the pervasive
use of short-term incentives in many organizations where informa-
tion is revealed over time and cooperation is required for efficiency
(Hertzberg et al. (2010)). Agents with long-run concerns may have
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low incentives to monitor agents with whom they interact, since such
monitoring may bring bad news and decreases the continuation pay-
off.
Third, in my model, even if monitoring is delegated to a third
party, the principal may want to delegate the decision to the agent.
Under delegation, the bad agent is willing to reveal his type more
quickly and first best may be approximated. If the agent is to report
to the decision maker, however, the agent will conceal his information
and preclude first best. Hence, I give an additional rationale for the
widespread use of delegation, even when information is potentially
verifiable.
Relationship Finance: One of the main applications of the model
presented here is the banking industry. In particular, my model is
very similar to that in Diamond (1991), who is the first to study the
interplay between monitoring and reputation but under the assump-
tion that the monitor is short-lived. Among other things, he discovers
a ”paradox of monitoring” whereby cheap and effective monitoring
fails to create incentives since lenders face a lack of commitment to
cut defaulters off the credit market. I extend the analysis to incorpo-
rate long-run motives for the monitor. I show that, if the credit score
of the firm is sufficiently low and the bank has a lack of commitment,
dynamic interactions may not be able to solve such problems18.
More generally, my model sheds light on the use of relationship
finance versus arm’s-length or directly placed financing. Relation-
ship finance is widely understood as a way to overcome informational
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. Banks accumulate in-
formation about their borrowers over time, both through communi-
cation and monitoring. The value of communication depends on the
incentives of the incentives of the borrower to maintain a reputation
and the threat of monitoring. Communication saves on information
acquisition costs and, therefore, is valuable for the bank. The model
predicts that banks starting long-term relationships will use less ex-
ternal or formal monitoring and rely more on communication and
soft information than borrowers engaging in arm’s-length financing.
This is consistent with empirical evidence presented in Kano et al.
(2011) who show that firms benefit most from bank-borrower rela-
tionships when they do not have audited financial statements. Sim-
ilarly, Blackwell and Winters (1997) finds that banks less frequently
monitor firms with whom they have closer relationships. Even more,
18There is one additional difference between both frameworks. He carefully
models the credit market and, therefore, allows interest rates to be endogenous.
Interest rates will be monotonic in the belief that the market has about the agent,
so that the per-period payoff of the agent will be endogenously increasing in this
belief. Adding this monotonicity would not change the results of my model, but in
the interest of simplicity I ignored it.
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many studies have found that banks lending to insolvent firms are
more likely to execute their guarantees or liquidate assets if they do
not have a long-run relationship with the borrower.
The existing literature has relied on two different theoretical frame-
works to understand this evidence. First, banks may suffer a soft-
budget constraint problem so that they are unable to commit ex-ante
not to refinance inefficient projects since the initial investment is
sunk Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). This lack of commitment, to-
gether with an agency problem, is most likely to be present in bank-
oriented economies where banks perform relationship financing and
have more ”at stake”. Even so, these refinancing decisions are sequen-
tially efficient, in the sense that the expected value of those projects
at the time of the refinancing decision exceed their liquidation value.
Therefore, this argument is insufficient to explain ”zombie-lending”,
i.e. the concession of debts to inefficient firms at a subsidized rate,
e.g. Caballero et al. (2008), since these rates are computed using all
the available information at the time of the decision.
The second common explanation relies on an efficiency-wage type
of argument. Banks may lower their monitoring effort because they
provide rents to entrepreneurs (lower interest rates) and, therefore,
alleviate the moral hazard problem. This hypothesis requires that the
entrepreneur is easily substitutable for the bank, and that the bank
has commitment to do so.
According to the hypothesis developed in my paper, however, the
terms of refinancing offered by banks to long-term borrowers will be
the less sensitive to the financial situation behavior than that of firms
with whom they have short-run relationships, and more so, whenever
these firms are in financial distress. Banks face the risk of losing
the relationship they created with a firm if it goes under and this
reduces the incentives they have to monitor their activities. This, in
turn, decreases the incentives for firms to devote resources to efficient
activities and, thus destroys value for the bank.
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to conclude for this argument
that relationship financing is not profitable for banks. As in Diamond
(1991), monitoring generates valuable information about the type of
the agent, which has a future value only in the case of relationship
financing. The novelty of this model stems from the behavior of the
agent, which is also affected by the current belief of the bank about
his type. Changes in behavior induced by changes in beliefs, decrease
the incentives to monitor for the principal and eventually overcomes
the positive effect of information generation. This is the trade-off
analyzed in the current paper.
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1.9. Conclusions
In this chapter I have presented a simple dynamic framework to
understand the interaction between an uninformed decision-maker
and an informed agent who may be bad in favor of one of the alter-
natives. The decision-maker may actively monitor the agent but lacks
commitment and is bound to suffer losses in case that she discovers
that the agent is bad. In this environment, we show that dynamic con-
cerns for the agent increase the payoff of the principal, but dynamic
concerns for the principal may decrease her payoff, if her belief about
the type of the agent is sufficiently pessimistic.
The key observation of the paper is as follows. In any equilibrium
with positive value of reputation, the principal must be (at most)
indifferent between auditing or not. Therefore, the agent will not
lie with probability 1 in any equilibrium. This increases the aver-
age value for the principal as long as the agent has not been found
to be bad with certainty. Monitoring more intensively increases the
probability that this happens, and, therefore, reduces the future value
of the principal. This implies that the dynamic value of monitoring
becomes negative when the probability that the agent is bad is suffi-
ciently high, and, therefore, the long-run principal monitors less in-
tensively. This increases the value of the agent and gives him more
incentives to cheat.
We have also shown that even if the principal is able to commit
to a fully contingent plan of future monitoring intensity, he can not
approximate her first-best payoff. This is because the principal retains
the decision rights even if monitoring was delegated, and once she
discovers the type of the agent, has no incentive to bias his decision.
Therefore, the incentive for the agent to reveal his type is diminished
and the agent has to monitor for a sufficiently long period of time
that his payoff is bounded away from first-best.
Finally, we have presented a number of different environments
where this insight seems to be present, and discussed the implica-
tions of our findings for organizational design, highlighting the ben-
efits of delegation and short-term incentives and the shortcomings of
communication. As for future research, it seems interesting to exploit
other organizational arrangements that may allow the principal to
commit and limit wrongdoing by the agent.
CHAPTER 2
Communication and Information Acquisition in
Networks
’The single biggest problem in communication is the
illusion that it has taken place’. George Bernard
Shaw
2.1. Introduction
Economists have long recognized the acquisition and transmission
of information between individuals as one of the key objectives of or-
ganizations (Arrow (1974).) Indeed, organizations take over the role
of prices when these fail to accomplish their mission of aggregating
disperse information and encouraging individuals to take the appro-
priate actions. Mimicking the role of prices in market transactions,
organizational design should enable efficient information transmis-
sion within the organization and provide the right incentives to create
and maintain information flows from outside. While these two ele-
ments have been separately studied in different papers1, this chapter
constitutes the first attempt to analyze their interrelation and their
implications for organizational design. I argue that this link may ex-
plain some of the features of many real-world organizations.
A good example of an organization in which information transmis-
sion is important is the stock market. Most information is conveyed
through prices, but it is also well-known that word-of-mouth com-
munication and other networked activities are ubiquitous in those
environments. Shiller and Pound (1986) shows that most trading de-
cisions involved interpersonal communication, and very few agents
make their own research. Similarly, Hong et al. (2005) finds strong
correlation in the positions of traders based on the same city, control-
ling for the location of the assets. This evidence suggests a strong
use of personal contacts in information acquisition. This has been
neglected in the majority of papers studying financial markets, where
1Bergemann and Valimaki (2002) provides a general framework to study infor-
mation acquisition. For studies in communication, see Crawford and Sobel (1982).
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the information structure is a reduced-form stochastic process. In par-
ticular, no explicit distinction is made about the sources originating
the signals2.
This chapter highlights a bidirectional interaction between infor-
mation acquisition and communication. First, smooth information
transmission helps to disseminate relevant information and coordi-
nate behavior, while reducing the duplication of efforts in information
acquisition. But differences in the information available to different
agents will hamper their (mutual) communication, since it introduces
a wedge between the conditional expectations received after some
signal is observed. Agents communicate their signals before obtain-
ing all the relevant information and use interim beliefs which depend
on the amount of information that they expect to receive. For in-
stance, more informed agents rely less on every particular signal than
less informed agents. This implies that their second-order beliefs will
differ from their first order beliefs and information transmission will
be noisy. Players have an incentive to become conservative when com-
municating information to less informed ones and aggressive when
communicating to more informed ones.
To get a grasp of the implications of this trade-off, I study a stan-
dard beauty-contest type of game (Morris and Shin (2002)) where
every agent must take a decision facing a trade-off between adapta-
tion to global uncertainty and coordination with the rest of players. I
allow them to choose the amount of information they acquire (Hell-
wig and Veldkamp (2009), Myatt and Wallace (2011)) and to report
this information to their peers through a discrete (undirected) net-
work. In the benchmark model, this communication takes the simple
form of a round of messages in which every agent chooses a profile of
reports to each of his peers conditional on the information he owns.
2.1.1. Applications. As already mentioned, the model captures
the environment faced by communities of financial analysts. First,
beauty contests are a useful, albeit simple, tool for trying to model
financial markets and asset prices3. Second, information about finan-
cial assets is disperse and different traders may differ in the amount
of information they have access to. Finally, information transmission
among traders does not occur through a ”market” but rather under
2Two recent studies constitute an exception to that rule, in that they address
the impact of exogenous networked information structures on trading behavior.
? studies a model with ”behavioral” communication through simple topological
structures and their results in trading. Ozsoylev and Walden (2011)) studies a
rational-expectations equilibrium in which agents communicate truthfully through
an exogenous random network. See Section 2.8.2 for a relation of our study with
this literature.
3 See, for instance, Allen et al. (2006).
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bilateral, stable relations which we characterize using the network
device.
Nevertheless, this model may well be applied to many different
settings in which communication is strategic and unverifiable. For in-
stance, it may be useful to understand information sharing between
firms operating in similar markets where strategic complementari-
ties are present (Raith (1996).) Pairwise communication is poten-
tially less costly and more difficult to detect but may create problems
in terms of credibility. Similarly, our framework may be applied to
the study of complex organizations4 whenever information is disperse
and coordination is key for performance. In these organizations, de-
cisions must be taken rapidly5 and communication is informal. For
instance, coordination, information acquisition and good communi-
cation are the key factors underlying the design of Intelligence Agen-
cies (Garicano and Posner (2005)). In this model we argue that their
interaction may indeed reduce performance.
2.1.2. Overview of the Results. In this chapter, I show that dif-
ferences in the amount of information different agents have access to
difficulties the communication among them and that more informa-
tion acquisition generates an external effect which may be positive
or negative. Our results show that truthful information transmission
depends on both the network topology and the information acquisi-
tion technology. In particular, very centralized structures (formally,
core-periphery networks) or very decentralized (regular networks)
yield efficient communication, while hybrids typically don’t. We also
show that, in line with previous literature, information acquisition is
monotonic in the centrality of the player if communication is truthful,
but it may be not monotonic otherwise. The intuition for this result
stems from the fact that the degree of substitutability of information
between players is endogenous to the structure of communication. In
this sense, information is a non-rival good if and only if the organiza-
tion allows for truthful revelation.
Finally, I show that our qualitative results extend to an environ-
ment with more rounds of communication, as long as players leave
the network once they take their actions. In particular, I identify net-
work structures for which, independently of the number of rounds of
communication, information cannot be truthfully revealed between
two linked players because they will use it differently. In this sense,
4A recent literature in the economics of organizations, starting from Dessein
and Santos (2006) has used similar specifications. See Calvo´-Armengol et al.
(2011) for a discussion of the relation with this literature and a deeper analysis
of its implications to organizational design.
5See Section 5 for a brief analysis of the cost of delay in decision-making and
its implications for communication.
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the fact that our results rely on the use of interim beliefs does not
imply that the assumption of one round of communication is crucial6.
2.1.3. Related Literature. This chapter contributes to a couple
of strands in the literature. First, there is a small but influential
literature on communication in networked organizations started by
Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1988)7 (1991) and Radner (1993), within
the realm of team theory. There are no strategic issues and the prob-
lem is simply to choose the optimal organization of workers to mini-
mize time processing, due to bounded rationality. The typical finding
of this literature is that hierarchical organizations are likely to be op-
timal for information transmission purposes. Adding strategic incen-
tives to the transmission of information, we find that hierarchies are
likely to be suboptimal since they yield a very unequal distribution of
information and, therefore, weak incentives for truth-telling.
Second, there is a growing literature of game-theoretical views
of networked organizations. Calvo´-Armengol et al. (2011) study in-
formation acquisition and truthful and costly communication in net-
works. They show that information acquisition is increasing in cen-
trality in a linear-quadratic model of network formation. However,
this chapter is the first study addressing information acquisition and
strategic communication jointly. Finally, a couple of recent contribu-
tions deal with strategic information transmission in networks. Ha-
genbach and Koessler (2010) analyze a game in which signals are
strategic complements and agents differ on their preference relation
over outcomes, but there is no information acquisition and the pref-
erence divergence is exogenous to the network structure. Galeotti
et al. (2009) analyze a similar game, but their focus is on compet-
ing signals and analyze the effect of congestion and other network
characteristics on the amount of information transmitted.
To conclude, two recent contributions analyze repeated commu-
nication in societies. Anderlini et al. (2012) consider an organization
composed by one-period-lived agents who send reports to their suc-
cessors regarding some underlying uncertainty. They show that the
existence of an exogenous preference bias impedes common learning
of the parameter of interest. Acemoglu et al. (2010) is somewhat
closer to our spirit and they consider the case of large societies trans-
mitting over time information relevant to the decision of whether to
undertake or not a project. They highlight an strategic motive to lie
to induce agents to transmit their information, but they concentrate
mostly on truthful communication.
6The crucial assumption is that agents may take actions after each round of
reports.
7See also Bolton and Dewatripont (1994)
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2.2. Model
Consider a set N of agents. Let 2 ≤ n < ∞ be the cardinality of
N . Every agent is concerned with the realization of some aggregate
uncertainty θ. In the case of financial analysis, θ would be the funda-
mental value of an asset. I assume that θ follows a normal distribu-
tion, N(0, τ−1σ ). Agents, however, do not observe the realization of θ.
They only receive a signal xi = θ+ ηi, with ηi normal with zero mean
and variance τ−1i where τi is the precision the signal held by agent i.
Notice then that {xi}i∈N are independent conditional on θ but may
not be identically distributed, since we allow agents to choose some
precision τi ∈ R, by paying some cost c(τi) ∈ R+. For the moment, I
only assume the cost function to be increasing and convex. Let τi(g)
be the information acquisition strategy of agent i when playing on
network g. Let τ = (τ1, τ2, .., τn) be the profile of precision choices for
each player, which is known at the end of the first period period8
Agents are linked through an undirected and discrete network g,
so that i and j have a link if and only if ij ∈ g. A link is interpreted as
the existence of a communication channel between two players. Al-
ternatively, one can define the network by using a matrix G of zeroes
and ones, such that the coefficient Gij = 1 ⇔ ij ∈ g9. Define a walk
from i to j as a collection {k1, k2, .., km} such that k1 = i, km = j and
klkl−1 ∈ g for all l = 2, 3, ..,m. A path is the shortest walk between
two players, i, j, so that we write p(i, j). Let |p(i, j)| be its length. If
such a path does not exist |p(i, j)| =∞. A network is connected if and
only if for all i, supj |p(i, j)| <∞. A network is minimally connected if
for every i, j ∈ N , there exists one and only one path linking them.
A component gs ⊂ g is a subnetwork of g such that the nodes of
gs, N s, is a set of players satisfying for all i, j ∈ N s, p(i, j) < ∞ and
for all k ∈ N \N s we have that p(i, k) =∞. Let ns be its cardinality.
Most of this chapter is concerned with one round of simultaneous
communication among linked players, contingent on their private sig-
nals. Denote by Ni(g) = {j ∈ N : ij ∈ g} the set of neighbors of agent
i, so that every agent submits a message profile mi = {mij}j∈Ni(g) and
learns a message profile mi = {mji}j∈Ni(g). For simplicity, I shall as-
sume that mij ∈ R, so that a reporting (pure) strategy for agent i is
a mapping mi : R → R|Ni(g)|−1.I denote with Nij(g) = Ni(g) ∩ Nj(g)
the set of common neighbors of i and j, and Ni−j = Ni(g) \ Nij(g)
the set of neighbors of i who cannot communicate with j. Finally, let
8This assumption may be relaxed by imposing that agents get to know a noisy
signal of the precision of other agents. For instance, one could allow the technology
of information acquisition to be random and only the cost would be observed.
9For the most part we use the set-theoretic definition, since we find it more
intuitive. However, some definitions are better presented in matrix form.
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N∗i (g) = Ni(g) ∪ {i} be the neighborhood of agent i augmented to
himself10.
To allow for mixed strategies in reporting let µij(y | x) is the prob-
ability of sending report mij = y conditional on signal x. I shall
require that
∫∞
−∞ µij(y | x)dy = 1. Let mˆij(x) = {y : µij(y | x) > 0}
and mˆ−1ij (y) = {x : µij(y | x) > 0}.
In the last stage, players must take an action ai ∈ R, conditional
on all the information available to maximize
(2.1) U = −(ai − θ)2 − 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(ai − aj)2 − c(τi)
According to (2.1) every agent wants to match a weighted average of
the underlying uncertainty and the actions of other players. However,
it also implies that they would be trying to lead other agents to take
the same action as they expect to take themselves when making their
report. Let
ai : R× R|Ni(g)|−1 → R
be the strategy of agent i contingent on her information. We assume
that transfers contingent on reports or actions are not possible in this
environment. Transfers would be difficult for enforce since informa-
tion is not verifiable. More importantly, once information has been
acquired, players would like to communicate it at any cost -so that
prices for reports may be negative (people are paid to listen.) Be-
cause of this, the market is unable to encourage research by pricing it
in the absence of further commitments. Finally, the price of research
of every agent should depend on both his position in the network and
the effort of every other player, requiring very complicated schemes.
As a matter of fact, contracts for information (e.g. consulting or ad-
vising services) require that providers have no intrinsic interest in
the final decision. For instance, financial analysts are not allowed to
make priced reports on assets on which they have interest.
To end this section, I summarize the timing of events, as displayed
in Figure 1. In the first stage, nature draws a state of the world and
every agent chooses some information acquisition τ . Signals are then
drawn conditional on the state of the world according to the chosen
distributions. In the second stage, every player communicates to her
peers through an undirected network g. Finally, conditional on all
her information, every player chooses an action ai and payoffs are
realized.
10We extend analogously the remaining concepts, so that, for instance, N∗ij =
N∗j ∩N∗i
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2.3. Truthful Revelation of Information
In this section, I identify the conditions under which it exists an
equilibrium in which all signals are credibly revealed. More precisely,
I determine the conditions under which there exists a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium Equilibrium where
mij(xi) = xi for all i ∈ N , j ∈ Ni(g), xi ∈ R
Notice that, should all information be revealed, there exists a linear
equilibrium in the last stage11, where actions will satisfy.
ai = biixi +
∑
j∈Ni(g)
bijmj =
∑
j∈N∗i (g)
bijxj
for some weights where bij ≥ 0 and
∑
j bij ≤ 1. In general, the weight
that i puts on signal xj will depend on the total precision of the report
of agent j - that is, the accuracy of both its signal and its message -,
the total amount of information i has access to and the weight that
others put on that signal12. Suppose ij ∈ g and consider the incen-
tives of agent i to truthfully reveal his type to j whenever everybody
else does so. Using the envelope theorem, I write his indirect utility
in the last stage as
−E [Vi] = E
( ∑
j∈N∗i (g)
bijxj − θ)2
+
1
n− 1
∑
k 6=i
E
( ∑
h∈N∗i (g)
bihxh −
∑
l∈Nj(g)\{i}
bjlxl − bjimi)2

11See Lemma A.2 a proof of existence of linear equilibrium. Notice that if
communication is truthful our model reduces to a standard beauty-contests with
agents receiving a number of signals equal to their degree and with endogenously
determined precision. See Myatt and Wallace (2011) for such a model.
12See Lemma 1 in Appendix .2
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FIGURE 1. A Balanced network
FIGURE 2. A Star network
First order condition for truthful revelation is then
bjixi = E
 ∑
h∈Ni(g)
bihxh −
∑
l∈Nj(g)\{i}
bjlxl | xi
(2.2)
= biixi +
 ∑
h∈Ni(g)
bih −
∑
l∈N∗j (g)\{i}
bjl
E [xk | xi]
DEFINITION 2.1. A networked information structure {g, τ} is bal-
anced if for every i, and for every j ∈ Ni(g), such that τi + τj > 0
(2.3)
∑
l∈Ni(g)
τl =
∑
k∈Nj(g)
τk
Thus, a networked information structure is balanced if for every two
agents who communicate, the amount of information they expect to
receive before taking their actions, and so their hierarchies of beliefs
are ex-ante aligned. Regular networks where every agent acquires
the same amount of information or star networks in which only the
center acquires information satisfy this conditionv (see Figure 2). An-
other such network is depicted in Figure 1, where black nodes are
2.3. TRUTHFUL REVELATION OF INFORMATION 29
informed and blue nodes are uninformed. The following Proposition
shows that if a networked information structure fails to satisfy it, no
equilibrium involves truthful information transmission.
PROPOSITION 2.2. There exists an equilibrium with truthful revela-
tion at every relevant link if and only if either τσ = 0 or the networked
information structure is balanced.
PROOF. The proof is a straightforward application of the results
in the literature. If τσ = 0, E [xk | xi] = xi and
∑
j∈Ni(g)
bij = 1 for all
i ∈ N . Hence condition (2.2) holds. Otherwise it is needed that
(bji − bii)xi =
 b
h∈Ni(g)ih
−
∑
l∈N∗j (g)\{i}
bjl
E [xk | xi]
Clearly, this holds if the network is balanced, because bji = bii and∑
l∈Nj(g)
bjl =
∑
k∈Ni(g)
bik . Now, assume that the network is not balanced
and suppose that the exists a pair ij ∈ g, |Ni(g)| > |Nj(g)|, I shall
show that if the network is balanced j cannot make any information
acquisition effort and that
∑
l∈Ni−j τl = 0. In particular, and without
loss of generality, assume that Ni(g) = Nj(g) ∪ {k}. Notice that since
the network is balanced it must be the case that τk = 0. However,
since
∑
l∈Ni(g) τl =
∑
l∈Ni(g) τl, if τi > 0, there must exist and k /∈
Ni(g), there must exist another k′ ∈ Nk(g) ∩ [N \Nj(g)] such that
τk′ = τi. However, again
∑
l∈Nk′ (g) τl =
∑
l∈Ni(g) τl. Hence, either τj =
0 or |Nk′(g) ∩ [N \Nj(g)]| > 1. Finally notice that the total amount of
agents is assumed to be finite, so that there must exist some kt such
that Nkt ⊂ Nkt−1 and hence, a contradiction with the network being
balanced. Therefore either τi = 0 or τj = 0, so that bji = bii.
To see that it never holds if the network is not balanced notice
that bji the only source of discrepancy between players is the amount
of information received. In particular, i and j agree about the degree
of agent j so that there is no bias generated in asymmetric networks
per se. However, if i holds more information than j
τi∑
k∈Nj(g) τk
>
τi∑
k∈Ni(g) τk
and so bii 6= bji. But then∑
h∈Ni(g)
bih −
∑
l∈N∗j (g)\{i}
bjl 6= 0
so that truthful revelation will not be part of any equilibrium. 
The intuition for the result is simple. Truthful revelation requires
that hierarchies of beliefs are ex-ante aligned. This holds if the prior
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does not convey any information or if information is symmetric (to-
tal precision of the signals received by every agent is the same.) The
reason is that an informative prior creates a wedge between the ex-
pectation of the underlying state conditional on a given signal and
the signal. Hence, second order beliefs - the belief of i about the be-
lief of j about θ- conditional on i’s signal will differ with the current
belief of i. This generates an incentive to i to lie her information and
align those beliefs.
Notice that in our model cheap-talk equilibria does not rely on
an exogenous preference bias. Ex-post, all agents would be better off
if they had communicated perfectly their signals. However, in the
interim, if the networked communication structure is not balanced,
they have an incentive to misreport their information. In particular,
well-connected agents have an incentive to make conservative reports
about the state of the world, while badly connected ones have incen-
tives to make aggressive reports. In equilibrium, these biases are un-
derstood by the receiver and they result in a reduction of the amount
of information conveyed. Thus, differences in ex-post information,
introduces vagueness in communication and reduces welfare.
Every equilibrium in the information transmission game is char-
acterized by a partition of the set of signals, where a given report m
is to be understood simply as x ∈ [mk,mk+1]. However, given the
Gaussian structure of our uncertainty the equilibrium of this game
is not tractable. In general, networks in which agents with differ-
ent information communicate, are unable to share all their private
information. This generates a twofold effect on the marginal value of
information. First, it encourages information acquisition since agents
have access to less information. Second, it discourages information
acquisition since they lose ability to affect other players’ behavior and
thus reduce the coordination value of information. In this sense, in-
formation is less valuable if it is difficult to transmit.
In other words, if a network can attain an efficient communica-
tion equilibrium, information does not endogenously depreciate in its
spread through the network. More generally, the degree of depreci-
ation (or substitution among signals) will depend on the amount of
information acquired by each agent and the degree distribution of the
network13.
Let T = {i ∈ N : τi > 0} be the set of agents who acquire informa-
tion. Define gT = {ij ∈ g : ij ∩ T 6= ∅} as the connected component
of g ∩ T in which all the links which did not allow any information
flow (τi + τj = 0) are deleted.
13See Section 4 for a more detailed analysis on the amount of information
acquired.
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COROLLARY 2.3. Assume that gTk ⊂ g is a balanced component of
g ∩ T . Then, there ∃J ⊂ NTk and γ > 0 such that τi = 0 if i /∈ J and for
all i, j ∈ J ∣∣∣N∗i (gT )⋂ J∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣N∗j (gT )⋂ J∣∣∣ = γ
and if γ 6= |J | then for all i ∈ J , ∣∣Ni(gT )∣∣ = ψ, for some ψ ≥ γ
Notice that the corollary implies that each component of a bal-
anced networked organization can be partitioned in two subsets of
agents. One of these subsets (J) contains all those who acquire in-
formation. Every player must be linked to a given number of agents
within this set (γ), potentially including himself. This class of net-
works include the regular network, the core-periphery and mixtures
of both. Figure 1 represents one of the possible configurations sat-
isfying 2.3. Informed agents are depicted with a black node, while
uninformed agents are depicted in blue.
This Corollary does also restrict the set of information acquisition
patterns for other type of networks. For instance, in a line this con-
dition requires that it can be partitioned in 2 + (N − 5)/3 pairs of
players who acquire information linked by agents who do not acquire
information. Moreover, if every agent acquires information, there is
no agent who can communicate truthfully to all of his neighbors. In-
deed, we have the following result14.
PROPOSITION 2.4. Let gT be a line with more than three individuals
and assume that τi > 0 for all i. For all i ∈ gT , there exists j ∈ Ni(gT ),
such that i cannot communicate truthfully with j
PROOF. In Appendix A.2 
A line is depicted in Figure 3. Terminal nodes (depicted in blue)
are disadvantaged in terms of the information they expect to receive.
Therefore, when communicating they tend to be very aggressive and
thus, equilibrium communication is vague. Because of this, their
neighbors now are disadvantaged when communicating with others
and are very aggressive with their neighbors. Following this rea-
soning one can show that vagueness in communication between two
agents (under some conditions on the network structure) implies that
vagueness will spread through every node of the component. This
gives a new rationale for dense networks in organizational design,
since adding links may not only increase the amount of information
14This result could be extended by allowing for more general networks al-
though some conditions are necessary. In particular take g to be the complete
network and delete the link {ij}, it is easy to see that among the rest of agents
communication does not change. On the other hand, it is clear that symmetric
trees could be included in this Proposition (a symmetric tree is such that all agents
have the same number of links except the terminal nodes, who only have one)
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FIGURE 3. A Line
transmitted through new connections but also soften the incentive
constrains in the communication with previously existing links.
2.4. Information Acquisition and Communication
So far we have seen that regular and core-periphery networks can
support efficient communication equilibria for a given pattern of in-
formation acquisition. However, we would like to know whether in-
deed the pattern of information acquisition would lead to such net-
worked information structures. That is, starting with a given network
g, is there an equilibrium in the information acquisition stage-game
such that the resulting {g, τ} allows for truthful communication?
PROPOSITION 2.5. Assume that the networked information system
gT is connected and that communication is truthful in the continuation
game. Then, τi and τj are strategic complements if and only if j /∈ Ni(g).
Alternatively τi and τj are strategic substitutes if and only if j ∈ Ni(g).
PROOF. In Appendix A.2 
This result highlights the importance of studying the interaction
between communication and information acquisition, even in the
case of truthful information transmission. The literature on infor-
mation acquisition in Beauty Contests have shown that if there is
need for coordination, information acquisition satisfies strategic com-
plements. On the other hand, if there is communication, informa-
tion becomes a public good and information acquisition must sat-
isfy strategic substitutes. Finally notice that a similar result holds in
Calvo´-Armengol et al. (2011) but in their framework each agent is
concerned with the realization of a local random variable and the
information of others is only relevant to predict their action.
The literature on communication networks has also highlighted
the role of centrality (see Calvo´-Armengol et al. (2011)) in shaping up
the incentives to acquire information. Does this monotonic relation
extend to this framework? A negative answer is provided below
EXAMPLE 2.6. Assume that g is a line with 3n+5 players with n in-
teger, and let c(τ) = kτ . There exists an equilibrium gT with truthful
information transmission and non-monotone pattern of information
acquisition
The idea for this counterexample is depicted in Figure 4. An
equilibrium exists with truthful revelation of information, where only
those nodes depicted in black acquire information. To see that this
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FIGURE 4. A line with truthful revelation
FIGURE 5. A Star network
is an equilibrium under the prescribed technology, notice that blue
nodes have lower value of information than black nodes (since they
will trigger communication losses from any marginal increase in in-
formation acquisition) and face the same marginal cost. Thus, they
optimally restrain from acquiring information.
However, there are certain conditions under which the result ob-
tains. Let Vi (τ) be the expected utility of an agent located in position
i if the vector of information acquisition patterns is τ . Thus if g sat-
isfies Corollary 2.3, a necessary condition for a τ ∗ equilibrium profile
to be such that {g, τ ∗} is balanced is that
(2.4)
∂
∂τj
Vj(τ
∗)− c′(τj) ≥ 0 ≥ ∂
∂τi
Vi(τ
∗)− c′(0), where j ∈ T ∗, i ∈ N \ T ∗
COROLLARY 2.7. Assume that c(τ) is linear. If g can be partitioned
so that gT = ∪gTk , where for each k = 1, 2, ...K, with 0 < K ≤ N,
and gTK satisfying the conditions in Corollary 2.3. Then, there exists an
equilibrium truthful information transmission.
The intuition behind the Proof of this Corollary is depicted in Fig-
ure 5. If the player located in the red node increases his information
acquisition effort, and the cost is linear he would obtain an increase
in his payoff not larger than the increase that the central node would
obtain. This is because more precise signals for the red node worsens
communication at every other link and diminishes total coordination.
Thus, specialization obtains where only the central node acquires in-
formation.
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2.5. Welfare and Information Acquisition
There are two important questions for which we do not have a def-
inite answer. First of all, if we do not have full information transmis-
sion, can we still say something about the pattern of information ac-
quisition? In particular, it is important to know whether more central
agents will still acquire more information despite the fact that they
cannot communicate it perfectly. The following Proposition shows
that this also fails to be true.
PROPOSITION 2.8. Let a component g′ ⊂ gT be a connected line, and
assume that τi > 0 for all i ∈ g′. There exists some nˆ > 3 , such that if
n′ > nˆ, extreme players acquire more information than their neighbors.
This follows from the fact that if the residual uncertainty of the ex-
treme player is always larger than or equal to that of the extreme one,
and if the network is sufficiently large, this implies higher incentives
for information acquisition.
In general, different communication structures would lead to dif-
ferent patterns of information acquisition. In many studies informa-
tion acquisition is treated as any other public good (see, for instance,
Galeotti and Goyal (2010)) so that, the signals one agent collects
and the signals others collect are perfect substitutes. However, in our
model, the degree of substitutability is endogenous. In particular, if
communication is truthful, those signals received by the neighbors of
i are perfect substitutes from the signals coming from j15. This im-
plies that the effort of i decreases in the effort of his neighbors. On the
other hand, if the communication equilibrium were characterized by
full babbling, information acquisition efforts become strategic com-
plements (see Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009)) Our strong conjecture
is that there is a monotonicity in the degree of substitution between
information acquisition strategies of different players and the qual-
ity of their communication. This link highlights the importance of
considering both problems simultaneously.
Another important issue is that of welfare. That is, which net-
worked information structures yield better outcomes in terms of co-
ordination and adaptation? Clearly, among minimally connected net-
works, either the star or the circle can be optimal. The star provides
better coordination but only one agent acquires information. In a
circle, every agent aggregates two signals which may offset the coor-
dination losses from decentralized information. This depends on the
cost of information acquisition and the environmental uncertainty.
A somewhat more important question is whether adding links
does always lead to a reduction in the total variance resulting in
15Note that in this model, Gaussian signals imply that all that matters is total
precision. See Proposition 3.
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FIGURE 6. Welfare.
decision-making 16. The following example shows that this is not
the case
EXAMPLE 2.9. Suppose that gT is formed by two star components
with sufficiently many agents and the most revealing equilibrium is
being played. Adding the link between both hubs is welfare detri-
mental.
An example of such network is depicted in Figure 617. In the
most revealing equilibrium of the game generated by the original
network, two agents acquire information and they communicate it
truthfully to their neighbors, each of which receives one signal and
suffer small coordination losses (they fail to coordinate with the other
component.) If both hubs link to each other, now in any equilibrium
welfare (as measured by total variance) is lower. First, assume that
the pattern of information acquisition does not change. Now, coordi-
nation only improves between the hubs and worsens between every
other linked agents. Further, adaptation also decreases at every other
player. Thus, if there are sufficiently many agents, the sum of ex-ante
payoffs decrease. Now it may also be that either 2 or 6 (or both) cease
to acquire information. In this case the comparison is even simpler.
Each of the agents linked to the hub who ceases to acquire infor-
mation would increase his information acquired and there would be
wasteful duplication of effort, while each of the spokes would still
obtain one signal.
16This criterion is used in the team-theoretic literature starting from ?
17more peripheral agents may be added if needed
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2.6. The Role of Hierarchies
Most of the previous literature on communication in organizations
agreed that hierarchies are an efficient way to transmit and process
information. Radner (1993) shows that a hierarchical structure (a
tree in the jargon of graph theory) is the most efficient structure for
an organization that tries to process and summarize a large amount of
disseminated information. Bolton and Dewatripont (1994)extended
this logic to environments with an infinite stream of signals that
have to be processed with minimal delay. Geanakoplos and Milgrom
(1988) showed that, under bounded rationality of managers, hierar-
chical organizations are the most efficient way to use a group to over-
come the limitations of its members. Garicano (2000) shows that a
hierarchy is the natural organization for a firm that must solve prob-
lems in order to produce if workers cannot identify those problems
that they cannot solve.
A common feature of all these models, however, is that they as-
sume that the members of those organizations are not strategic. In
particular, they acquire the information they are told to acquire, they
transmit it truthfully and they take the action that the organizations
wants them to take, conditional on the information available. In our
model, however, agents are rational, strategic players who try to max-
imize their payoffs in a coordination game under uncertainty. Un-
certainty creates a wedge in the way agents with different locations
update their beliefs and, therefore, incentives to misreport their in-
formation. In hierarchies (or trees) agents at the top are bound to
receive more information than agents at the bottom, and thus, infor-
mation transmission fails to be efficient.
In the real world this problem is solved in the following way. In-
formation is acquired by lower-ranked agents who communicate it
upwards to managers. These managers aggregate information and
pass it back to the periphery in the form of ”recommendations” or
”commands”. Therefore, although hierarchies are efficient in terms
of information handling they require some source of ”power relation”
among agents in order to conveniently achieve the organizational
goal. Our model lacks this power relation since every agent is en-
titled to ”decide” and information does not move backwards once it
has been aggregated.
2.7. Repeated Communication
One of the main driving forces of the results presented above is
the use of interim beliefs and one round of communication. That is,
since agents only communicate once, they rely heavily on the beliefs
they hold after observing their signal, when making their reports.
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This is the source of their intrinsic bias. I shall explore now this as-
sumption by constructing a dynamic environment in which the game
presented above is (potentially) infinitely repeated. I construct the
game following the ideas in Acemoglu et al. (2010)).
The game is as follows. At time zero, every agent makes some in-
vestment in information. Then, both θ and the signals are drawn from
the appropriate distributions. At time t = 1, agents report through the
network g1 = gT some messages conditional on their signals and their
positions in the network m1ij(xi) ∈ R ∪ {∅} 18. Let mi1 be the profile
of reports received by agent i in period 1. Then, agents take actions
ai,1 ∈ R ∪ ∅ where ai = ∅ is defined as inaction. After that, actions
are realized and agents who took an action leave the game19. Agents
who decided to stay inactive keep move into the next period by losing
δ > 0. At time t = 2, g2 = g1 ∩ {i ∈ N : ai,1 = ∅} and again chose a
report mij(xi;mi1) ∈ R∪{∅} where ij ∈ g2 and an action ai,2 ∈ R∪∅.
Whenever at the end of time t, the set {i ∈ N : ai,t = ∅} = ∅ the game
ends and every agent receives his payoff according to the original
payoff net of the corresponding loss for delay δti, where ai,ti 6= ∅.
PROPOSITION 2.10. Suppose that {τ, g1} is balanced. Then there
is an equilibrium of the repeated game in which every agent reports
truthfully and makes an action in the first period.
This implies that the positive results in the previous section sur-
vive into this extended game. However, do the negative ones survive?
A qualified answer would be yes. In particular, there are some net-
worked information structures at which information cannot be trans-
mitted at any round.
PROPOSITION 2.11. Suppose that {g1, τ} is a line, and assume that
τi > 0 for all i. Then for every t = 1, 2, ..t¯, there exists an equilibrium
in which all agents leave at period t. Further, no equilibrium involves
perfect communication.
PROOF. In Appendix A.2 
The intuition is simple. Suppose that a given agent (a) has only
one neighbor (n). Suppose further that his neighbor has at least one
additional informed neighbor. n takes the action (and leaves) one
whenever he has acquired enough information, and therefore does
not transmit the last piece of information to a. Therefore, at every
stage before exit, n has an incentive to misreport his information to
18We allow for explicit witholding of information.
19This is the main restriction of the framework since it will not be optimal
for them to leave (for sufficiently small δ) and clearly their information is still
valuable for others. However, since their actions are now taken, there is no hope
that their reports are truthful. Indeed, it is easy to construct examples in which
overall welfare is lower if all agents stay until everyone took their actions.
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a. Thus, in this extension of the game, as long as players leave the
network after taking their actions with positive probability the qual-
itative features of the static equilibrium remains, even if they hinge
on agents using interim beliefs.
In other words, whenever communication takes place between
agents who ”expect to learn more on the future”, our results are likely
to hold. However, in most studies, the assumption is that players are
either informed ex-ante or ex-post but they never get ”some informa-
tion” in the interim. Repeated communication games, for instance,
assume that players have acquired all the relevant information at
stage zero. We argue that this assumption has deep implications in
the results, and it is not clear why this possibility should be ruled out.
An exception in this literature is Acemoglu et al. (2010) They
allow for strategic communication of signals using interim beliefs.
However, in their model the strategic interaction is different, since a
given player does not care about the action taken by others. In par-
ticular, an agent would only want to lie if that induces other agents
remain in the network and keep communicating with him. To man-
age so, she is willing to misreport her true signal in order to ”confuse”
her peer and make him stay. This is not possible in our model since
the residual variance does not depend on the ”content” of the reports.
PROPOSITION 2.12. Suppose {g1, τ} is not balanced, and assume
that τi > 0 for all i. If there exists i ∈ N such that Ni(g) ⊂ Nj(g),
Ni(g) 6= Nj(g), then either both agents hold the same information (and
take the same action) or there is no equilibrium with perfect information
transmission between them.
PROOF. In Appendix A.2 
This result shows that poorly informed individuals (in that they
have access to a subset of the sources of their neighbors) will also
have problems to communicate with those sources, independently of
how many rounds of communications are allowed. This may seem
counterintuitive, since an agent who talks to a poorly informed agent
has a very good posterior belief over the belief of his neighbor. The
problem is that this second order belief may be far away from the be-
lief he holds! This yields a novel intuition that was not present in the
static game. Namely, since agents are willing to wait only if waiting
yields new and useful information, communicating with agents who
have access to that information is not only more useful, but easier (in
the sense that it reduces the vagueness in communication) than to
those who have no new information.
Equilibrium behavior depends (discontinuously) in the discount-
ing of players, as it is the case in many dynamic games. This is be-
cause the value of staying in the network depends on the number of
neighbors who remain and communicate their signals. If the cost of
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continuing in the game is high enough, some (informed) players de-
cide to leave early and communication does not spread. If the cost
is low enough, however, the network structure is not relevant since
information would travel in a frictionless manner and eventually co-
ordination would be achieved. In this sense, it is the cost of time that
gives a specific content to the network itself.
2.8. Conclusion
2.8.1. Summary. In this chapter I argue that modeling explic-
itly the information acquisition and transmission may be important
to understand the functioning of many organizations and markets,
even if there are no exogenous conflict of interest between the play-
ers. I show how the topology of the communication network and
information acquisition technology affect the quality of information
transmission within the organization. I fully characterized the set
of networked information structures that support perfect communi-
cation as an equilibrium and the pattern of information acquisition
they generate. These networks have the property that every two indi-
viduals who communicate are expected to hold the same amount of
information by the time they make their decision.
I also show that whenever information revelation is not truthful,
the pattern of information acquisition effort may change dramatically.
For instance, in the line with sufficiently many players, no agent can
communicate truthfully with all of her neighbors and the information
acquired in equilibrium is not monotonic in centrality. This result is
in sharp contrast with the previous literature, which highlighted the
role of centrality in the intensity of the effort.
I have also extended the model to allow for more rounds of com-
munication. I have shown that our results are qualitatively robust to
such an extension, as long as players abandon the network as soon as
they make their decisions. If an agent expects to receive more infor-
mation in the future, she will use her interim beliefs when forecasting
the actions that their communication partners are going to undertake.
If she expects to received a different amount of information in the fu-
ture (compared with her communication partners) she will be biased,
and truthful communication will not be an equilibrium.
Finally, the analysis has provided insights on the public good na-
ture of information in networked organizations. First, whenever com-
munication is not truthful, information transmission exhibits decay or
endogenous depreciation. This depreciation depends on the density
of the network because more links reduce average distance between
two randomly chosen nodes and also because it allows for better in-
formation transmission. Second, in most organizations, the amount
of information acquired by one agent may be increasing or decreasing
in the total amount of information acquired by others. In a setting
40 2. COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION ACQUISITION IN NETWORKS
where information flows perfectly, information would be non-rival
and the effort in information acquisition would become strategic sub-
stitutes. However, in our setting agents need to ”be like their peers”
in order to extract information from them. Moreover if information
transmission is noisy, they need to ”know what others know” in order
to predict their behavior.
2.8.2. Discussion and Future Research . The main limitation
of this chapter is the inability to obtain close form characterization
of the equilibrium under imperfect information. This precludes any
analysis on the effect of imperfect communication on the equilibrium
decisions or welfare comparison across different networks. These is-
sues, albeit important, have already been studied in depth in rational-
expectations models20. In this sense, this analysis complements this
strand literature, by introducing endogenous information acquisition
and strategic communication. These papers find that more central-
ized networks lead to excess volatility in prices and that denser net-
works lead to excess correlation across agents. Interestingly, they
have devoted most of their attention to those network topologies that
our model predict to be more efficient in information transmission.
As indicated earlier future research may shed some light on the in-
formation transmitted between players who cannot commit to truth-
fully reveal their information. One approach would be to allow only
for all-or-nothing communication, i.e. any two links can sustain ei-
ther truthful revelation or no communication at all. Another ap-
proach would be to modify the structure of the model and introduce,
for instance, a simpler, discrete state space, where the information
revelation strategies can be pinned down. These extensions would
allow for a much clearer rank of networked information structures.
20See Xia (2010) and Ozsoylev and Walden (2011)
CHAPTER 3
Information Technology, Decision Making and
Incentives
’Everybody’s marriage is falling apart except ours.
You see the problem is communication.... too much
communication.’. Homer J. Simpson
3.1. Introduction
One of the main objectives of the very existence of organizations
is the use of sparse information to achieve a common objective (Ar-
row (1974)). Modern organizational theory has emphasized the role
of private incentives in the acquisition, transmission and use of in-
formation. According to this literature, private incentives may not
be fully aligned with the common goal, inducing inefficiencies in
decision-making. To solve this problem, a number of organizational
design tools like contingent compensation and promotions or delega-
tion have been proposed. In this chapter, I argue that another way in
which some of these problems may be addressed is the communica-
tion and information system itself. The way an organization uses and
transmits information would shape and (potentially) align the incen-
tives and behavior of its members, and in this sense contribute to the
creation of value for the firm.
As a matter of example, consider the problem faced by a global
company selling some product in different countries. Each national
unit would like the product to be designed for their particular de-
mand characteristics, but making a product that is fundamentally dif-
ferent for every country may preclude the organization to obtain cost
economies. Adaptation to local conditions entails higher sales and
profits for every unit but limits coordination and may harm the over-
all performance of the company. To solve this problem, decisions
made by the central unit would not fully incorporate local character-
istics, which on its turn creates an incentive for each particular unit
to overstate their need of adaptation. Whereas some recent studies1
have analyzed this problem using a cheap talk game2 we allow each
1See, for instance, Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008)
2That is, a game in which an agent makes an unverifiable report concering
the state to an informed party that makes a report-contingent decision about some
variable that affects the payoff of both players.
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local party to perform an investment, tailored to the payoff-relevant
state (e.g. demand characteristics). In our example, these invest-
ments may be thought of as the advertising and marketing effort of
the national units to sell a product that is not very well suited to their
characteristics. The important aspect is that different demand char-
acteristics require different levels of investment, so their observation
allows the central unit to infer the true state of the world. The main
question that we can address in such a framework is which is the op-
timal precision with which the central unit would like to learn the
investment decisions by each unit. That is, which factors underlie the
adoption of more efficient information technologies (IT).
There is more than anecdotal evidence that this is an important
problem in many organizations. Management scholars had long rec-
ognized the problem that headquarters face whenever they have to
rely on information from their business units. Chandler’s study on
the management practice of some of the biggest US firms in the first
half of the 20th Century devotes significant attention to these prob-
lems (Chandler (1969)). In particular, both Standard Oil and General
Motors struggled to obtain both accurate information and appropri-
ate coordination from their Business Units. As Chandler points out
for the case of Standard Oil3
”(...) But any allocation of funds or other resources
was based on the information provided by the af-
filiates themselves. The parent made little effort to
check on the way they employed their resources”
To model this environment, we use a three-stage game played be-
tween the business units and the headquarters (HQ). In the first stage,
the central unit decides the information technology of the firm. That
is, she chooses the quality of communication and the precision of the
signals that will be transmitted inside the organization. In terms of
the previous example, each agent may submit a report to the central
unit, specifying their local characteristics and the investments they
will undertake to improve their payoffs. The precision with which
the central unit learns this may depend on the information technol-
ogy available and the resources allocated in this process. We view
this as a long-term decision which give some commitment power to
the organization, and explore the role of this power in softening the
strategic incentives to invest. In the second stage, each party learns
their type and (subsequently) undertakes a costly investment. Both
the state of the world and the action determine the preference rela-
tion over the possible decisions that the principal may choose. Finally,
in the last stage, the principal observes each report through the cho-
sen partition and makes a decision for each party.
3See Subsection 3.1.2 for a more detailed case
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3.1.1. Related Literature. The present chapter is related to a
number of strands in the literature. Inspired by the seminal work of
Marschak and Radner (1972), recent works by Alonso et al. (2008)
and Rantakari (2008) analyze the conflict existing in multi-divisional
organizations that must adapt to local conditions. Agents communi-
cate via cheap talk messages between themselves and with the cen-
tral unit. Surprisingly, the incentive conflict is better solved by re-
lying on horizontal rather than vertical communication. Thus, they
obtain that decentralized decision making (which in their framework
implies giving decision rights to the local parties) may be superior
to centralization even if coordination is very important. As pointed
above, the main contribution of our chapter stems from the introduc-
tion of (observable) investments that may help soften the incentive
conflict within the organization, and the analysis of the way decision-
making and investments will be distorted because of the agency prob-
lem these organizations face.
Many papers have recently studied the optimality of various decision-
making schemes in delegation problems. Szalay (2005) shows that
the principal may distort ex-post decisions to induce the agent to ac-
quire relevant information. Ambrus and Egorov (2009) show that
inefficient (money-burning) activities may be useful as a way to pro-
vide incentives for more efficient decisions. Ivanov (2010) studies a
standard delegation problem in which the principal may control the
precision of the information received by the agent. He shows that
the principal will be better off by restricting the precision as a way to
align incentives. Both studies interpret their results as a rationale for
more centralized decision-making processes4.
Other related papers that study the problem of decision-making
and incentives include Athey and Roberts (2001) and the recent pa-
per by Dessein et al. (2010). In their framework, agents are delegated
decisions concerning overall profits but must be rewarded using only
a partial measure (because of a multitasking problem.) The main dif-
ference is that the effort is related to a different task, and hence it
generates the incentive misalingment.
Finally, I would also like to point that this chapter relates to a
(small) strand of the organizational design literature in which the
object of study is the information and communication technology.
Hansen (2010) studies a career concern model in which the decision
of how much feedback to give to workers is endogenous. He points
out a similar trade-off between information and incentives in a sig-
naling game, but he does not consider the effect on decision-making,
4This literature interprets lower response of decisions to the environment to
higher centralization. In our model the optimal degree of centralization is de-
termined by the environment, but the variation of decisions will depend on the
endogenous information structure.
44 3. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, DECISION MAKING AND INCENTIVES
where information is useful. Lee and den Steen (2010) have a dy-
namic model in which the firm chooses how much information about
technological process to store to trade-off innovation and efficiency.
3.1.2. The Case of Novo Nordisk . Novo Nordisk 5 is a Danish
Pharmaceutical Corporation whose main business is the production
and commercialization of insulin. It is the market share leader in
most countries and the second company world-wide. Insulin is a very
standardized product, and the technology used presents huge scale
economies - one factory could account for a third of the world pro-
duction. Most of the innovations are related to the ease of use of the
product and the reduction of secondary effects, to facilitate commer-
cialization and compliance to changing regulations.
Novo Nordisk produced all their insulin in Denmark but packed
it and prepared it for human use in different countries, according to
their specific needs. Regulations and distribution channels are indeed
the most important piece of local information that this firm needed to
succeed. However, local units empowerment was weak and although
communication was fluid and the HQ received a lot of information
about their performance, they rarely were held accountable of their
actions. In particular, all that was required was that the local unit
complied with the main values of the firm.
This seemed to work fine in most of the world but, apparently,
it was not the case in the US. Their main rival, Eli Lilly, was clearly
ahead in that market, and the HQ claimed it was mainly the local unit
fault. On their turn, the US branch claimed that they were not given
enough freedom and that legal conditions in the US were very differ-
ent. Further, they were claiming that F.D.A. - the American Agency
for Food and Drug certification - were increasing there controls and
restrictions after a war between generic and non-generic producers
in the US.
In this environment of conflict, Novo Nordisk tried to gain ground
on their rivals by introducing a new product that enabled patients of
type II diabetes - the less severe one - to control it in a much more
efficient and comfortable way. However, the F.D.A. did not approved
this new product since its production did not meet the new standards
they impose. Novo Nordisk decided to stop the production worldwide
and defer their clients in the US to their main rival, with considerable
losses. HQ understood that new managerial practices were called
upon.
Although they recognized this as a coordination problem, they did
not call for higher centralization. On the contrary, they increased em-
powerment of the international divisions. Further, they eliminated
5This Subsection is based on a Podolny et al. (2000)
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many of their information feedback programs, and decided to fo-
cus on simple statistical measures to appraise performance. These
changes seemed to have positive impact on performance, since they
managed to recover their position by 1997.
We would like to highlight that this case fits well into our model
and allows us to anticipate some of the main results. In particular,
since the US division could have pushed the F.D.A. towards a differ-
ent policy, it is clear that local information was interrelated with the
performance of the different division, which is our main departure
from previous literature. Second, the solution proposed to achieve
better coordination implied less information transmitted but better
incentives to provide the appropriate level of effort. Third, increas-
ing empowerment did not lead to higher statistical control but to an
increase in the responsibility of each unit.
3.2. The Model
As we pointed out above, we will consider organizations com-
posed by a central unit (p) and N agents (i). Each agent observes
a realization of a random variable i ∼ F () a symmetric distribu-
tion with full support on [−¯, ¯]. Let f be the associated density. We
shall use  = (1, 2, ..., N) = (i, −i). The agent may perform an ef-
fort ai∈ A some compact and convex subset of R containing [−¯, ¯],
with cost c : A → R+ symmetric and (weakly) convex with c(0) = 0.
Let a∈ AN .
The principal chooses the informational system for the firm in
the first period. Formally, the central unit chooses a correspondence
m : A→ 2A with a typical element m(ai) = Ak for all ai∈ Ak⊂ A. We
assume that whenever Ak are non degenerate, Ak are Borel sets. No-
tice that information is truthful but may be imprecise. Given the sym-
metry of the model, I will impose that information structures are also
symmetric around ai = 0. That is, if we order sets by their infimum,
we have that ai ∈ Ak−l and 0 ∈ Ak, then −ai ∈ Ak+l. Once the in-
formation structure is chosen, all agents learn their types and choose
an action from the set of actions. Finally the principal observes the
actions performed according to the partition chosen and the report
and makes sequentially optimal decisions. In the last stage, payoffs
are realized.
Both the shock and the action determine the preferred point of
the agent θi = i + ai for the decision di∈ Y ⊆ [−¯, ¯] chosen by the
principal. Then we can write the agent’s payoff as
(3.1) U(i, ai, di) = −(θi − di)2 − c(ai)
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Notice that we abstract from monetary transfers, since participation
constrains are not relevant for our framework, and contingent trans-
fers are not allowed6. We assume that the principal cares about ef-
ficiency of the whole organization. In particular, he would like to
maximize the sum of profits in each division but must bear a cost
from adapting decisions to each unit, so we write its payoff as
(3.2) V (d) = −
∑
i∈N
(θi − di)2 − γ
∑
i∈N
(di − d¯)2 −
∑
i∈N
c(ai)
where γ > 0 measures the relative importance of coordination and
d¯ =
1
N
∑
i∈N
di
is the average decision. In this model there is no exogenous bias in
the preferences of the agents with respect to the central unit. The
incentive to misreport stems from the fact that the principal will re-
spond to private information less than the agent would like to.
We would like to highlight that although its precise formulation is
somewhat new, this problem belongs to the class of decentralization
problems presented in section 2 of Holmstrom’s seminal contribution
(Holmstrom (1980)). We do not consider delegation since in our
framework each individual decision will depend of the whole set of
signals - not only on the signal received by that individual. Hence, we
focus on communication procedures where the central party retains
the formal rights to decide. In any case, we try to capture the spirit of
delegation as an institution that requires low commitment. Whereas
delegating principals commit not to overrule decisions, our principal
commits to an informational system that operates in the firm and it is
not expected to be changed in the near future. Notice that, as in the
example above, the principal would like to commit to a different de-
cision rule in the last stage, due to the interaction of private informa-
tion and a free-rider motive that comes from the common decision.
Allowing her to choose the precision of the informational structure
somewhat softens that need but does not substitute it completely.
We now summarize the game generated by an information struc-
ture m(·), Γm. Observing the information structure and his realiza-
tion, each agent picks one action ai∈ A and the principal observes
6There are many reasons for this. First, the interest of this chapter is to study
the role of information in decision-making and incentives. Including compensation
would add more effects to this comparison. Second, linear-quadratic utility func-
tions are not well-suited since it is the only single-peaked utility function where
first best is attainable. Third, optimal compensation would be based on soft infor-
mation, which would lead to verifiability problems.
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m = (m(ai))i∈N , the profile of contingent reports from each unit. Fi-
nally the principal chooses some d∈ Y N . We concentrate on Symmet-
ric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game starting after a choice
m(·).
DEFINITION 3.1. A Symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of Γm
is a strategy profile for each agent a∗i (·), a decision rule for the prin-
cipal d(m(a)) and a set of posterior beliefs µ (· | m) such that
(3.3) for all , a∗i )() ∈ arg maxE
[
U
(
, a′i, d(m(a
′
i, a
∗
−i)
)]
(3.4) for all m, d(m) ∈ arg maxEµ
[
V (d′.a∗) |m]
(3.5) µ ( | Ak) = f()∫
Ak
a∗−1i ( a)dF ()
, for all Ak ⊂ A
Solving it backwards, notice that in the last stage, the principal
maximizes
(3.6) V (d, a∗) = −Eθ
[∑
i∈N
(θi + a
∗ − di)2 | m
]
− γ
∑
i∈N
(di − d¯)2
where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of
payoff-relevant variables conditional on the information available in
the last stage.
From (3.6) we have that
(3.7)
di(m) =
(
1− (N − 1)γ
N(1 + γ)
)
E [θi | m] + (N − 1)γ
N(1 + γ)
E
∑
j∈N\i
θj | m

which implies that the expectation of the decision for agent i condi-
tional on his own report is.
(3.8)
Eθ−i [di(m) | mi] =
(
1− (N − 1)γ
N(1 + γ)
)
E [θi | mi] = (1− λ)E [θi | mi]
Given this decision rule, the problem of each agent is to choose an
investment level to minimize
U(i, ai, di)= E θ−i
[
(θi − di)2 | mi
]
+c(ai)(3.9)
s.t.(3.8) and m(·)
3.2.1. First Best. In this subsection we derive the first best level
of effort. Notice that, without private information, the principal still
chooses the same decision for a given profile of investment levels. In
particular
dFB= (1−(N − 1)γ
N(1 + γ)
)(i+a
FB
i (i)) = (1− λ)(i+aFBi (i))
48 3. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, DECISION MAKING AND INCENTIVES
In order to make welfare comparisons, it is going to be useful to as-
sume that c(ai) = ca
2
i for some c > 0. then, a
FB
i (i) satisfies the fol-
lowing equation
(3.10)
aFB= − (N − 1)γ
c(N(1 + γ)) + ((N − 1)γ)i= −
(N−1)γ
N(1+γ)
i
c+ (N−1)γ
N(1+γ)
= − λi
c+ λ
= µFBi
where it holds that da
di
∈ (−1, 0). Notice that the slope is higher (in
absolute value) whenever λ is bigger and whenever the cost is lower.
We shall interpret λ as the need for coordination. It increases with the
number of units (N) and with the relative importance of coordination
γ.
3.3. Perfect Precision
We shall start the analysis considering the possibility that an or-
ganization chooses to perfectly observe the investment decision of its
divisions. That is, m(a) = m(a′) if and only if a = a′. In our model
inefficiency arises from the combination of unobservable actions, ad-
verse selection and uncertainty. In principle then, one would expect
that increasing precision would allow the firm to reduce both the
informational advantage of its divisions and the coordination losses
from sparse information. However, more information increases the
possibilities of deviation by agents, thus tightening the equilibrium
constrains and further aggravating the problem of a lack of commit-
ment.
As it is standard in communication games, there is multiplicity of
equilibria. First, there exists a fully separating equilibrium in which
every type tailors his action to his shock and there is no ex-post un-
certainty in decision making (see Proposition 3.2). However, as it
is standard in communication games an infinite number of partial-
pooling equilibria exist. In these equilibria, there is a positive mass of
types who choose the same level of effort, and the set of investments
that belong to equilibrium strategy is not (necessarily) connected.
However, we show that this equilibria are always Pareto-inferior to
the equilibria generated by choosing a different information struc-
ture, and hence, they are not relevant for the design problem of the
firm7.
Hence we shall consider first fully separating equilibria where ev-
ery possible type makes a different investment level and hence, there
7We follow the convention in organizational design, that players coordinate on
equilibria that are not Pareto dominated. See, for instance, Hermalin (1998)
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is no ex-post imperfect information8. In particular, when choosing the
level of effort, each agent takes as given the equilibrium strategies of
the other players that, together with the decision rule of the prin-
cipal, the mapping from actions to decisions. If the full separating
equilibrium is to exist, then this mapping can be characterized as
d(ai) = Eθ−i [di(a)] = (1− λ)E [θ(ai)] = (1− λ)
[
ai + a
−1(ai)
]
whenever the inverse effort function is well-defined. If we concen-
trate in the quadratic cost case we can find a solution to the in-
dividual agent’s problem (3.9) of the form ai(i) = µi−a(0). Be-
cause of the symmetry, it is going to be true that a(0) = 0, and so,
[ai + a
−1(ai)] =
µ+1
µ
a = νa. In particular, first order condition is
(3.11) 2(θi−d(ai)) [1− (1− λ)ν] = −2ca
and so we can solve implicitly for ν as one root of the following equa-
tion
ν − 1= −c+ [1− (1− λ)ν]
2
.
So that
(1− (1− λ)ν)= −c
(1− (1− λ)ν)+(1− (1− λ)ν)
λν =
−c
1− (1− λ)ν
ν =
−c
[1− (1− λ)ν]λ
Since c > 0, it follows that there is a root with ν < 0, and hence
µ ∈ (−1, 0). The other root is positive and we discard it, since it can-
not be optimal9. Notice that
(3.12) ν =
−c
(1− (1− λ)ν)λ=
µ+ 1
µ
using (3.10) we have that νFB=−c
λ
, so if both cross it must be that
−c
1− (1− λ)ν)λ=
−c
λ
taking c > 0, implies that λ = (1+ c
λ
(1− λ))λ. But since 0 < λ < 1,
they cannot cross. Further, notice that for any ν < 0, (1− (1− λ)ν)λ > 1 > λ
and hence, we have that νFB< ν. From (3.12), follows that µ < µFB< 0.
That is, in the equilibrium with full separation, there is over-provision
of effort, for any possible need for coordination. It follows that, no
matter how hard is the public good problem, the signaling motive
8Notice then that condition B in the definition of Equilibrium becomes degen-
erate. This implies that only conditions P1 and P2 matter so that this equilibrium is
Nash.
9Recall footnote 9.
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generates over-investment. This is because, whenever coordination
becomes more important, incentives become more misaligned and
information transmission more inefficient. However, whenever coor-
dination becomes more important with respect to adaptation, infor-
mation is less valuable, so that information technologies are less im-
portant. In particular, using the equilibrium strategies, we can check
that the marginal effect of reports on the final decision and effort
provision are negatively related.
dν [(1− 2(1− λ)ν)λ] = −dλ(ν − ν2)(3.13)
dν
dλ
=
(ν − ν2)
[(1− 2(1− λ)ν)λ]< 0(3.14)
⇒ dµ
dλ
=
− dν
dλ
(ν − 1)2> 0(3.15)
Now we state this result in a proposition and show that indeed
these strategies are an equilibrium for the game with full precision
PROPOSITION 3.2. For any c > 0, λ ∈ (0, 1) there exists an equilib-
rium with full separation of types. The equilibrium level of effort satisfies
(3.12) and it exceeds the social optimum.
PROOF. We show that the strategies prescribed a∗(i) = −µi and
d∗i (a) = (1− λ)νai+λ
∑
j 6=i
νaj
are indeed an equilibrium. First, notice that the decision rule for the
principal is
di(a)= (1− λ)E [θi] +λ
∑
j 6=i
Eθj
= (1− λ)E [a∗(i) + i | ai] +λ
∑
j 6=i
E [a∗(j) + j | aj]
= (1− λ) (a∗−1(ai) + ai)+λ∑
j 6=i
[
a∗−1(aj) + aj
]
= (1− λ)νai+λ
∑
j 6=i
νaj
Further, it is easy to see, that the distribution of actions is also sym-
metric around zero, so that E [di(a) | ai] = (1 − λ)νai. Hence, each
agent minimizes
E
[
(θi−di(a))2
]
+ c(a)
s.t.E [di(a) | ai] = (1− λ)νai
and the result follows. 
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As we highlighted above, there exists multiple equilibria charac-
terized by pooling of different types into the same decisions. In the
reminder of this section we characterize them.
LEMMA 3.3. Let {a∗(·), d∗(·)} be an equilibrium for the game with
perfect precision. If there exist  < ′, such that a∗() = a∗(′), then, for
all ˜ ∈ (, ′) a∗(˜) = a∗()
PROOF. In the Appendix A.3 
This lemma implies that the equilibrium level of effort can be par-
titioned by a sequence of cutoffs {ak}, such that, either ak= a() for all
 ∈ (k, k+1), or a∗() ∈ (ak, ak+1) for all  ∈ (k, k+1). Further, when-
ever there is full separation in a given range, the equilibrium strate-
gies must follow those in the previous proposition a∗() = ak−µ(− k).
In particular, this lemma rules out equilibria involving not connected
sets of types choosing the same action.
This results are important as a way to simplify the analysis of the
optimal information structure. Indeed, if a set of types cannot be
induced to choose a given action under some equilibrium of the full
information system, actions cannot be supported as
LEMMA 3.4. Under full precision, any equilibrium satisfies dk≤ dk′
whenever ak> ak′.
PROOF. In the Appendix .3. 
3.4. Efficiency
In this section, we compare the efficiency properties of the equi-
librium with full precision with those of equilibria in the game gener-
ated by partitions with pools. In particular, we show that for any pos-
sible environment (c and λ), and for any possible equilibrium played
within the game generated by the finest partition, there is a coarser
partition which attains a weakly higher payoff. To show this we con-
struct a partition involving pooling in low types (that is, types close
enough to zero). This information structure softens the constraints
imposed in equilibrium under full precision, reducing the distortion
in effort for all types, while incurring in information losses only in the
selected interval. Thus, the principal is made better-off.
DEFINITION 3.5. An information structure presents pooling if there
exists some Bk ⊂ A with
∫
Bi
dF () > 0 and m(ai) = m(a′i) for all
ai, a
′
i ∈ Bk
By Lemma 3.3, we will concentrate on information structures which
can be characterized by a sequence of cutoffs. So that sets Bk can al-
ways be written as
Bk = [ak, ak+1]
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PROPOSITION 3.6. Suppose that λc > 1. Then, for any distribution
F and a λˆ, such that for any λ ≥ λˆ there exists an information structure
m′ with pooling with an equilibrium {a′k}k=1,..K , that is (weakly) more
efficient than the information structure with full precision m.
PROOF. In the Appendix A.3 
Notice that this result does not hinge on any direct cost associated
with a better information structure. It shows that even if information
was completely cheap, not all the firms would buy a perfect system.
In our constructive proof, we show that for small enough shocks, the
gains accruing for more informed decisions are overwhelmed by the
inefficient activities undertaken by the local units when they try to
communicate that information. Hence, it is optimal for the HQ to
pool those small types, forgo some precision in their decisions and
reduce inefficient activities.
In what follows, we perform comparative statics to understand
better which firms will adopt more precise information technologies
according to our model
3.5. Comparative Statics
Which firms gain more from implementing information technolo-
gies to control the activities down the hierarchy? To answer this
question we first need to obtain some characterization of the opti-
mal information structure. Notice that Proposition 5 only tells us that
if the need of coordination is sufficiently big firms are better off by
acquiring some inefficient information technology. We do not know
however, how inefficient this would be. To perform comparative sta-
tistics, we need to assume that the shock is uniform.
ASSUMPTION 3.1. i is uniformly distributed
PROPOSITION 3.7. In the optimal partition, there exists a thresold
∗ ≤ ¯ such that there is perfect precision if |a| ≥ a(∗) and (partial)
pooling if |a| < a(∗)
PROOF. In the Appendix A.3 
The intuition is similar to that of Proposition 3.6. If the principal
prefers pooling at a given type, it must be that the improvement in
effort allocation overcomes the decrease in the precision of the deci-
sion at those types. The improvement in the allocation is increasing
in the number of types above, so that lower types are more attractive.
Our model is, therefore, able to predict that HQ will receive more
precise information when adaptation is more important. Senior man-
agement should be called upon only on exceptional cases. This orga-
nizational design is usually referred as ”management-by-exception”
and it has been discussed extensively in the literature.
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PROPOSITION 3.8. ∗ is increasing in the need of coordination λ and
the support of the distribution ¯
PROOF. In the Appendix A.3 
Increasing the need of coordination (weakly) reduces the optimal
amount of information transmitted. This is because lower need for
adaptation leads to less sensitivity of the decision of the HQ to in-
formation, more importance of local responses and lower value of
information. Notice, that we can also see this result as a span-of-
control type of result. As N grows, the amount of information opti-
mally acquired about any of the agents decreases. The reason is not
cognitive limitations but increasing agency costs. Furthermore, we
see the solution as being akin to a management-by-exception type of
organization, where only big problems are solved up in the hierarchy.
3.6. Empirical Relevance
There is a growing literature that studies the relation between
organization and information technologies. Some examples are Bres-
nahan et al. (2002) and Bloom et al. (2012), where they study the
effects of IT adoption on organizational design. Our focus is on the
effect that different designs (and more broadly environment condi-
tions that lead to some particular designs) have on the IT adoption
by the firm.
First, we have shown that treating the IT as exogenous may bias
significantly the results obtained in empirical applications. Increas-
ing the acquisition of information for decision-making may result in
worse incentives for lower-level units and, therefore, harm overall
performance. If those firms who do not acquire better IT are those
with more severe agency problems, an empirical analysis that takes
IT as exogenous would conclude wrongly that IT improves perfor-
mance. Interestingly, IT acquisition has been found to yield signifi-
cant improvements in productivity only for those firms who perform
organizational change, where these potential agency problems may
be solved using other tools.
Second, we provide an explanation for the heterogeneity in the
level of adoption of IT at the firm level. Firms with higher need for
coordination would try to acquire information from outside the firm
directly10 and would be less willing to invest in IT systems that ac-
quire information from inside11. Since these software had been con-
sistently shown to be correlated with productivity gains (Aral et al.
10Chandler (1969) relates the way in which A. Sloan managed to get this in-
formation by driving to meet his dealers directly and getting data from the office of
car registrations.
11Software like Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), Supply Chain Manage-
ment (SCM) and Customer Relationship Management (CRM).
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(2007)), it was not clear why firms in different industries adopt them
in an unequal way. In this sense, our chapter provides a simple ex-
planation in terms of organizational design of the firm. Whenever,
multi-divisional firms require more coordination or they confront a
more uncertain environment, we expect them to have less incentives
to acquire better internal information technologies.
Some of the qualitative results of this Chapter can be used to inter-
pret the organizational architecture implemented by ABB, one of the
most successful and complex firms in the world. ABB implemented a
”three-strikes-and-out” policy for conflict resolution (Roberts (2004))
Two managers who disagreed could take their issues to a higher level
twice but they would be replaced after the third time. The idea is that
only big issues should be dealt higher in the hierarchy and the prob-
ability of many of those between two units was really small. It is a
general feature of multi-divisional organizations to rely on the hierar-
chy for conflict resolution only on very exceptional cases, as pointed
out by Eccles (1985).
3.7. Conclusions
In this chapter, we tried to study the relationship between agency
problems and Information Technologies in multi-divisional firms. Al-
though the empirical literature has identified substantial efficiency
gains for the acquiring IT firms (Aral et al. (2007)) there is large het-
erogeneity in the level of adoption across firms. In our model,even
if IT’s are useful to improve decision-making, they may create per-
verse incentives throughout the organization, leading to some firms
to reduce their level of adoption. We have shown that the result de-
pends crucially on the ability of the different units to signal credibly
their need for adaptation and the inefficient activities this possibil-
ity generates. Our model makes testable predictions on the effect of
span-of-control, need for coordination and the variability of the envi-
ronment in the level of information technology adoption of the firm.
As for future research, it would be interesting to explore a model
where communication could take place both through cheap talk and
signalling activities. Cheap talk would increase the quality of infor-
mation transmission for a fixed level of precision of the information
structure but would also imply lower incentives for signalling through
costly actions, and, therefore, the total effect on acquisition of infor-
mation is ambiguous.
APPENDIX A
Appendix
A.1. Proofs of Chapter 1
PROPOSITION A.1. A Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium Exists
PROOF. If the game has a recursive formulation, then standard
arguments show that such an Equilibrium Exists. The only complica-
tion is that the Value functions are not continuous (around 0). Nev-
ertheless, all that is required for the recursive formulation to be well-
defined is that Value Functions are Monotone. This is proved in a
series of steps. First, in order to economize on space, I’ll denote by
pµ is the probability with which the agent tells the truth given that he
has received no signal.
CLAIM A.1. Let µ > 0. V (µ) > V (φA(µ))
PROOF. First, assume that σ > 0. Then, for a contradiction as-
sume there exists some µ for which V (µ) ≤ V (φA(µ)). Notice that
pi − c+ δ
[
pµ
1 + pµ
V (0) +
1
1 + pµ
V (µ)
]
= piµ + δV (φA(µ))
so that
pi − c+ δ
[
pµ
1 + pµ
V (0) +
1
1 + pµ
V (µ)
]
≥ piµ + δV (µ)
pi − c+ δ pµ
1 + pµ
V (0) ≥ piµ + δ pµ
1 + pµ
V (µ)
which is true only for µ = 0.
Assume now that σ = 0. Since
V (µ) = piµ + δ
[
1
2
(1 + pµ)V (φA(µ)) +
1
2
(1− pµ)V (φB(µ))
]
V (µ) ≥ 2piµ + δ(1− pµ)V (φB(µ))
2− δ(1 + pµ)
Notice that if V (φB(µ)) < V (µ), we have that V (φB(µ)) ≤ V (φA(µ))
and we know that V (φB(µ)) ≤ V (φA(φB(µ))) so substituting µ for
V (φB(µ)) for a number of times, we will get as close as we want to
µ = 1 and we have a contradiction since limµ→1 V (µ) = V (1) = pi1−δ ≥
V (µ). So then assume that V (φB(µ)) ≥ V (µ), then
V (µ) ≥ piµ
1− δ =
pi
1− δ −
2q − 1
2(1− δ)(1− µ)F¯ (x(µ))
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To see that this cannot be true if σ = 0, notice that F¯ (x(µ)) > 1
2
(to see why, just consider the simplified problem of the agent who
is not allowed to go below the cutoff of the principal; maybe add a
restriction of F so that this holds). It is clear then that
V (µ) ≤ µ pi
1− δ + (1− µ)
[
pi
(1− δ) +
pi − c
2(1− δ)
]
=
pi
1− δ − (1− µ)
c
2(1− δ)
Hence a necessary condition is that
2q − 1
2(1− δ)(1− µ)F¯ (x(µ)) ≥ (1− µ)
c
2(1− δ)
(2q − 1)F¯ (x(µ)) ≥ c
but Assumption 1 guarantees that there exists x1 > 0 for which c =
F¯ (x1)(2q − 1) and we know that this is the static equilibrium, where
the value for the principal is much lower. Since for x higher than this,
c > (2q − 1)F¯ (x(µ)) we reach a contradiction and V (µ) > V (φA(µ))

CLAIM A.2. V is increasing
PROOF. For all µ such that that σ = 0 we have that
V (µ) = q − (1− pµ
2
)(2q − 1) + δ
[
1 + pµ
2
V (φA(µ)) +
1− pµ
2
V (φB(µ))
]
where pµ = (1− µ)F¯ (x(µ)).
Since σ > 0, V increases if pµ decreases. We can write V (µ) as
V (µ) = (1− 1
2
pµ)q +
1
2
pµ (1− q) + δ
[
1
2
(1 + pµ)V (φA(µ)) +
1
2
(1− pµ)V (φB(µ))
]
= q − 1
2
(1 + pµ)c+ δ
[
1
2
pµV (0) +
1
2
V (µ) +
1
2
(1− pµ)V (φB(µ))
]
Now, suppose that there exists two different beliefs such that µH > µL
and V (µH) = V (µL) = V
V = q − 1
2
(1 + pH)c+ δ
[
1
2
pHV (0) +
1
2
V +
1
2
(1− pH)V (φB(µH))
]
= q − 1
2
(1 + pL)c+ δ
[
1
2
pLV (0) +
1
2
V +
1
2
(1− pL)V (φB(µL))
]
Hence, we need that
1
δ
(pH−pL)c = (pL−pH)V (0)+(1−pL)V (φB(µL))−(1−pH)V (φB(µH))
Suppose first that pH ≥ pL. This requires that V (φB(µL)) ≥ V (φB(µH)),
where φB(µH) > φB(µL). Now, notice that this would lead to a de-
creasing sequence of {µki;µki > µk−1i}i=1,2k but we know that V (µ) is
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strictly increasing when µ→ 1. Hence, a contradiction. Suppose then
that pH < pL. Notice that
q − c+ δ
[
pH
1 + pH
V (0) +
1
1 + pH
V
]
=
q(1− pH) + 1
1 + pH
+ δV (φA(µH))
and
q − c+ δ
[
pL
1 + pL
V (0) +
1
1 + pL
V
]
=
q(1− pL) + 1
1 + pL
+ δV (φA(µL))
so that
δ [V − V (0)] pL − pH
(1 + pH) (1 + pL)
=
2q (pL − pH)
(1 + pH) (1 + pL)
+[V (φA(µH))− V (φA(µL)]
Since V −V (0) ≥ limµ→0 V (µ) = 1−δ , for δ large enough, this requires
that
V (φA(µH))− V (φA(µL)) < 0
which again will not be true since V (µ) is strictly increasing for µ
small enough. 
CLAIM A.3. If σ (µ) > 0 then U is non-decreasing and (1−µ)F¯ (x(µ))
is non-increasing.
PROOF. Notice that if σ is weakly decreasing, the value of the
agent is monotone. This follows from a standard choice argument,
since the agent is free to choose his report and facing a lower moni-
toring intensity yields higher payoffs.
Now, for every µ such that σ (µ) > 0 assume that V is non decreas-
ing. There exists an open set of such µ by Assumption 2. From this it
is easy to see that (1− µ)F¯ (x(µ)) must be non-increasing if σ is non-
increasing. To see why, assume for a contradiction that (1−µ)F¯ (x(µ))
is increasing in some open interval (µ0, µ1). The principal must be in-
different between monitoring and not monitoring at every µ such that
σ (µ) > 0. Therefore
VA,1(µ) = VA,0(µ)∀µ ∈ (µ0, µ1)
but then the principal’s value at the beginning of the period could be
written as
V (µ) = pµq + (1− pµ)piµ + δ [pµV (φB(µ)) + (1− pµ)VA,0(µ)]
But (1−pµ) and piµ are increasing in µ so that either V is decreasing at
µ or V (φB(µ)) is decreasing at µ. Finally notice that since at higher µ
the agent lies more often, a report of B is more informative, thereby
contradicting the monotonicity of V . 
CLAIM A.4. Every equilibrium is monotone.
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PROOF. To see this notice that in non-monotone equilibiria pµ is
increasing and σ is increasing (at least in some open interval). But
then in that open interval U must be decreasing. But in such a case
(write the expression down)
U(φB(µ)) < U(φA(µ))
But then there exists a sequence of values for agents whose belief
converges to zero that is increasing. But the limit of all these se-
quences is the infimum of all the values that are consistent with the
principal randomizing. Therefore we have a subsequence converging
from below to the infimum of all the equilibrium values. This is a
contradiction. 

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.2. It is easy to see that the agent lies
with positive probability for every µ. If this were not the case, the
principal will not monitor when he holds that belief and, therefore,
the agent’s value of lying today is strictly positive. Since the agent
does not lie in the prescribed equilibrium, both the strategic and the
truthful type produce the same distribution of recommendations and
the principal does not update his belief. Therefore, the future value
does not depend on the recommendation. This contradicts the fact
that the agent does not lie. Therefore, the biased agent lies for every
µ and recommends A with higher probability than the truthful type
and the belief follows a supermartingale. Since the principal’s value
of monitoring is bounded away from zero whenever the type of the
agent is low enough, in any equilibrium the agent gets caught with
probability 1. 
Before getting in the details of the Proof of Proposition 1.3, I
sketch its main steps. Let Ψ (µ) = E [V (φ(µ) | 1)] − E [V (φ(µ) | 0)]
be the dynamic value of the information. The proof shows first that
if such value is non-negative for every µ, any Markov Perfect Equilib-
rium requires the agent to tell the truth with sufficiently high proba-
bility. From this observation, it follows that V (µ) is bounded below
for µ > 0 and away from V (0). Finally, the fact that the agent tells the
truth sufficiently often and that V (µ) has bounded variation, implies
that Ψ (µ) < 0 for µ small enough, thus contradicting the hypothesis.
Then I show that if Ψ (µ) < 0 in some interval (a, b), it must be that
a = 0. This implies then that σl (µ) ≤ σs(µ) in such interval. This
establishes Proposition 1.3.
Using this result, one can show that if c > c¯(µ, q) then σs(µl) = 0
and thus σl (µ) ≤ σs(µ) for all µ and U l(µ) ≥ U s(µ). This establishes
Proposition 1.4.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.3. Assume that Ψ (µ) > 0 in any inter-
val (0, x). Clearly, in any MPE such that the principal monitors and
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µ > 0
(1− µ)(q − E (v(µ))) + Ψ (µ) = c
since for µ∗,
(1− µ∗)(q − (1− q))1
2
= c
if Ψ (µ) > 0,
(1− µ)(q − E (v(µ))) < (1− µ∗)(q − (1− q))1
2
for every µ > 0, so that
q − E (v(µ)) ≤ (1− µ∗)(q − 1
2
)
E (v(µ)) ≥ qµ∗ + 1
2
(1− µ∗)
That is, the strategic agent reports B with probability higher than
µ∗ > 0. The value for the principal is thus
V (µ) ≥ V (0) + µ
∗
2− δµ∗ c
But notice that V (µ) ≤ (1−µ) limx→0 V (x) +µV (1) by standard argu-
ments. Thus
V (µ)− lim
x→0
V (x) ≤ µ
[
V (1)− lim
x→0
V (x)
]
≤ µ
[
V (1)− V (0)− µ
∗
2− δµ∗ c
]
=
µ
1− δ c
[
2− (1− δ)µ∗
2− δµ∗
]
and that
φA (µ) = µ
1
1 + (1− µ)F¯ (xl(µ))
≤ µ 1
1 + (1− µ)(1− µ∗)
Let µl ∈ (0, 1) satisfy
µl
1− δ
[
2− (1− δ)µ∗
2− δµ∗
]
(1− µl)(1− µ∗)
1 + (1− µl)(1− µ∗) =
µ∗
2− δµ∗
which does not depend on q or c except for µ∗, if such a value exists
or else µl = 1. Notice that µl ≤ 0 is not a solution. Recall that
Ψ(µ) =
1
1 + (1− µ)F¯ (xl(µ)) [V (µ)− V (φA (µ))]+
(1− µ)F¯ (xl(µ))
1 + (1− µ)F¯ (xl(µ)) [V (0)− V (φA (µ))]
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but for µ < µl, V (µ)− V (φA (µ) < µ∗2−δµ∗ c and hence
Ψ(µ) <
1
1 + (1− µ)F¯ (xl(µ))
µ∗
2− δµ∗ c−
(1− µ)F¯ (xl(µ))
1 + (1− µ)F¯ (xl(µ))
µ∗
2− δµ∗ c
<
(1− µ)F¯ (xl(µ))− 1
1 + (1− µ)F¯ (xl(µ))
µ∗
2− δµ∗ c < 0
by construction. Thus Ψ(µ) < 0 in every interval (0, x) with µ < µl.
Therefore, for the long-run principal to randomize, the agent must lie
with higher probability at every µ < µl and xs(µ) < xl(µ). The fact
that σs (µt) > σl (µt) is shown next under the assumption that the
value of the agent is also higher. If the value where lower, the result
comes directly. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.4. Since the agent only cares about the
monitoring intensity, the ranking in payoffs obtains if σl (µ) ≤ σs(µ).
If µl = 1 the result is inmediate. If not, let µ∗ = µl and notice that
since that solution was independent of q and c, I can pick µ∗ freely.
Thus, it is clear that for µ > µ∗ there is no monitoring in either game.
For µ < µ∗ the patient principal monitors less often if the agent cheats
at most as much. Now, in equilibrium, the agent will increase his
cheating given that the principal has less incentives to monitor but he
will also get a higher payoff.
Now, I show that it cannot exist an equilibrium satisfying, σs(µ) ≤
σl (µ) for everty µ, there must exist another equilibrium (σ˜, x˜) for the
game with a short-run player such that σ˜s(µ) ≥ σl (µ). First notice
that, given the previous discussion, if σs(µ) ≤ σl (µ) it must be true
that xs(µ) ≥ xl (µ), for otherwise the incentives of the principal to
monitor at some belief must be lower. The following argument shows
that this cannot be part of an equilibrium. Notice that
xl (µ) (1− 2q + λ) (1− σl) = U l (φB (µ))− EA(U l (µ))
xs (µ) (1− 2q + λ) (1− σs) = U s (φB (µ))− EA(U s (µ))
Given that xl (µ) ≤ xs (µ), for every µ,
U l
(
φlB (µ)
)− EA(U l (µ)) ≤ U s (φsB (µ))− EA(U s (µ))
Let ∆ (E) = EA(U l (µ))− EA(U s (µ))
∆ (E) = (1− σl)U l (φlA (µ))− (1− σs)U s (φsA (µ)) + (σl − σs)U (0)
= (1− σl)(U l (φlA (µ))− U s (φsA (µ))) + (σl − σs) (U (0)− U s (φsA (µ)))
Clearly
(
σl − σs) (U (0)− U s (φsA (µ))) < 0. Thus we have
U l
(
φlB (µ)
)− U s (φsB (µ)) ≤ (1− σl)U l (φlA (µ))− U s (φsA (µ)))
or
U l
(
φlB (µ)
)− (1− σl)U l (φlA (µ)) ≤ U s (φsB (µ))− (1− σl)U s (φsA (µ))
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But notice that φlA(µ) < φ
s
A(µ) while φ
l
B(µ) > φ
s
B(µ) since the agent
lies more against a long run player. Thus the function U s is more
”steep” than the function U l for every µ. Since U(1) is the same for
both, it must be that U l(µ) > U s(µ) for almost every µ. Thus, it
cannot be that σs(µ) ≤ σl (µ) for every µ.
Notice that if U l(µ) ≥ U s(µ) for every µ, if σs(µ) < σl (µ) for
some µ < µ∗ it must be that xs(µ) > xl (µ) . But in that case, the
agent playing against a long-run principal faces a higher likelihood
and a higher cost in case of being caught and, therefore, cannot be
indifferent. Therefore xs(µ) ≤ xl (µ) and σs(µ) ≥ σl (µ).

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.5. The intuition for this result is the
standard Stackelberg-Cournot logic. On the margin, the principal
is willing tocommit to increase her monitoring intensity since this
encourages truthfulreporting. Notice that, in equilibrium, and condi-
tional on the agent telling the truth or not, if the principal monitors
at all she is indifferent between doing so or not.
VA,1(µ) = VA,0(µ)
With one-period commitment, however, the principal can affect the
probability with which the agent tells the truth. She chooses σ to
solve
max
σ
1
2
(1 + (1− µ)F (x¯(µ;σ))VA(µ) + 1
2
(1− (1− µ)F (x¯(µ;σ))VB (µ)
At the equilibrium σ and if σ > 0 we have
max
σ
1
2
(1 + (1− µ)F (x¯(µ;σ))VA,1(µ) + 1
2
(1− (1− µ)F (x¯(µ;σ))VB (µ)
which can be rewritten as
max
σ
1
2
[VA,1(µ) + VB (µ)]− (1− µ)F (x¯(µ;σ) [VB (µ)− VA,1(µ)]
so that clearly, by increasing σ the principal can increase his payoff.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.6. The argument proceeds in two steps.
I first show that there cannot be a fixed time t∗ > 1 such that, the type
of the agent has been revealed for sure, and the principal attains V g if
the agent is good. In the second step I extend the result to stochastic
time limits.
To see the first claim, notice that at time t∗−1, and independently
of the way in which the type is revealed, a strategic agent who has
not been revealed must choose action A independently of his current
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information. In particular, it must be the case that
xl [(1− q + λ)(1− σ¯) + σ¯q] + δU b ≥ xlq + δU g
= xlq +
δ
1− δ x¯(
1
2
+ λ)
while U b = q
1−δ . Hence
(A.1) xl(1− 2q + λ)(1− σ¯) + δ q
1− δ ≥
δ
1− δ x¯(
1
2
+ λ)
since 1
2
+ λ > q by assumption, for every σ¯, there is a δ∗, such that if
σ > δ∗, the condition is violated.
Now, for the second claim, notice that, if the IC constraint is to be
satisfied, the maximum intensity after every history h is
x(h)(1−2q+λ)(1−σ(h))+δ [(1− σ(h))U(h unionsq a) + σ(h)U b] ≥ δx¯U(hunionsqb)
Since U b < U(h unionsq a) ≤ U(h unionsq b), this gives an upper bound on σ(h)
for every x(h). Hence, let σ¯(h) be such an upper bound. Since σ¯(h) ∈
(0, 1) and x ∈ [xl, xh], both variables define a probability measure
over histories. Let
Ωt =
{
ht ∈ Ht s.t. µ ∈ {0, 1}
}
Let p(Ωt) be the implied probability of such event. All we have to
show is that
(A.2) C = (1− δ)
∑
ht∈Ωt
p(ht)
∑
t=0
δtσ(ht)c > 0
since in that event V g < q
1−δ −  for some  > 0, or V b < q−c1−δ since
(1− δ)
∑
ht∈Ωt
p(ht)
∑
t=0
δtF¯ (x(ht))(2q − 1) > 0
. We have
p(Ωt)− p(Ωt−1) =
[
1
2
∫
σ(ht)F (x(ht)dp(ht | ht−1 /∈ Ωt−1)
] [
1− p(Ωt)]
≤ 1
2
[
1− p(Ωt)] sup
ht∈Ψ(Ht−1\Ωt−1)
σ¯(ht)F (x(ht))
But because of the monotonicity property in the value function1.
sup
ht∈Ψ(Ht−1\Ωt−1)
σ¯(ht)F (x(ht)) ≤ σ¯(h∗)F (x(h∗))
1In the optimal solution to the Full Commitment problem the value function
is monotone as long as the value for the agent is monotone. This value, in turn,
is monotone as long as the monitoring intensity of the agent is non-increasing. A
simple local indifference argument shows that this must be true in the FC case.
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where at h∗, U(h∗ unionsq a) = U(h∗ unionsq b), and hence using (A.1)
x(h∗) = δ
σ(h∗)(U(h unionsq r)− U b)
(1− 2q + λ)(1− σ(h∗))
Clearly this condition imposes a bound on F (x(h)) for every σ(h). Let
that bound be F¯ (σ). Notice that the bound depends both explicitly
and implicitly on δ through the continuation values of the agent. To
further simplify the problem, let us fix the average expected continu-
ation monitoring intensity from the point of view of the agent to be
some σ′ < 1 so that
U(h unionsq r)− U b ≥ 1
1− δσ′ [1− 2q + λ] x¯
1
2
And thus
x(h∗) ≥ δ σ
1− σ
x¯
1− δσ′
1
2
As δ → 1
x(h∗) ≥ σx¯
2(1− σ) (1− σ′)
First assume that σ ≥ 2(1−σ′)
1+2(1−σ′) . In such a case, F (x(h)) ≤ 12 . Thus
σ¯(ht)F (x(ht)) < 1
2
for every ht and
p(Ωt)− p(Ωt−1) < 1
4
[
1− p(Ωt)]
while σ ≥ 2(1−σ′)
1+2(1−σ′) > 0. Thus (A.2) becomes
C ≥ (1− δ)
∑
t
(
3δ
4
)tc
= (1− δ) 4
4− 3δ c
Now if σ < 2(1−σ
′)
1+2(1−σ′) , since σ was the upper-bound of all possible σ
we have that σ ≥ σ′, and so σ ≤ 2(1− σ)2, so that σ ≤ 1
2
p(Ωt)− p(Ωt−1) ≤ 1
4
[
1− p(Ωt)]
and hence (A.2) does also hold. 
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A.2. Proofs of Chapter 2
In this Appendix we show first that there exists a Linear Equi-
librium under Perfect Information Transmission as long as the Econ-
omy is large enough compared with the maximum degree of a given
player. The rest of the Appendix contains omitted proofs
LEMMA A.2. Assume that the network is balanced. Then, a Linear
Equilibrium exists. The weight that a given player puts on his neighbor’s
signal is decreasing in the amount of information he has access to and
increasing in the information this player provides and in the centrality
measure of his neighbor.
PROOF. The argument is standard. Assume everyone else follows
a linear strategy, and let agent i have a neighborhoodNi(g). He solves
minEi (θ − ai)2 + 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Ei(ai − aj)
s.t. Ei(aj) =
∑
k∈N∗ij
bjkxk +
∑
k∈Ni−j
bjkEi(xk)
First Order Condition is
ai =
1
2
Ei(θ)+
1
2(n− 1)

∑
j∈Ni(g)
[∑
k∈Nij bjkxk + Ei(θ)
∑
k∈Ni−j bjk
]
+∑
j /∈N∗i (g)
[∑
k∈Nij bjkxk + Ei(θ)
∑
k∈Nj−i(g) bjk
] 
We can rewrite this expression as
ai =
1
2
1 + 1n− 1 ∑
j 6=i
∑
k∈N∗j−i
bjk
Ei(θ) + 12(n− 1) ∑
j 6=i
∑
k∈N∗ij
bjkxk
Since
Ei(θ) =
∑
k∈N∗i (g)
τkxk∑
k∈Ni(g) τk + τσ
we can write
ai =
∑
k∈N∗i (g)
bikxk
where the vector b may be identified through matrix algebra.
As it is well known, if τσ = 0,
∑
bik = 1 for all i ∈ N . Clearly if
τσ > 0, and the network belongs to the core-periphery network (see
Corollary 2) bik = τk∑ τk+τσ ,∑ bik < 1, which is an upper bound for the
other topologies. If the network structure is regular we have bik = b
for all i, k, i ∈ N∗i (k). Thus, letting m be the degree of the network
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we have
ai = mb
∑
k∈Ni(g)
xk
b =
[
1− K −M
2(n− 1)
]−1
1
2
τ
mτ + τσ
[
1 +
M
n− 1
]
where M is the number of links in the network and K is the number
of links not in the network. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.4. Order them from 1 to n, so that ii+
1 ∈ gT .If i ∈ {1, n}, the result follows because τ3, τn−2 > 0. Assume
then that Ni(g) = {i− 1, i+ 1}. I have to show that if i can com-
municate truthfully with i+ 1, then it cannot communicate truthfully
with i − 1. For a contradiction, assume it is not true. That is that i
can communicate with both. Notice that it follows that their residual
variances are the same. Assume that i can communicate with i + 1.
Clearly the sequence {1, 2, ..., i− 1, i} is a path that links i with 1. No-
tice that for 2 the result follows. By induction, assume that it holds
for i, we show that it must hold for i+ 1 ≤ n+1
2
. For the rest of agents
the prove is symmetric and thus omitted. Notice that i + 1 if could
communicate truthfully with i and with i − 1, and since i − 1 has
lower ability to coordinate than i+ 1 and the same residual variance,
so by proposition 4, i− 1 should decrease her information acquisition
(since all agents acquire some information this is feasible) and hence
that could not be an equilibrium. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.5 . The strategic substitutability of the
information acquisition effort between neighbors stems from the pub-
lic good nature of the information. I’ll show now the complementarity
Clearly, since gT is connected and balanced, it must be the case that∑
i∈N∗i (g)
τi = τ¯ > 0 for all i ∈ N
Returns from information are
(A.3)
∂
∂τi
E
[
(ai − θ)2 +
∑
j 6=i(ai − aj)2
n− 1
]
=
∂
∂τi

E
[
(
∑
j∈N∗i (gT ) bijxij − θ)
2
]
+
1
n−1
∑
j∈N
E
[
(
∑
l∈N∗i (g) bilxil −
∑
l∈N∗j (g) bjlxjl)
2
]

The first term in the last line of the equation measures the marginal
value of information to predict the state of the world. Clearly, it is
constant for all agents since all their actions are equally informed.
It decreases in the effort of other players. The second term can be
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rewritten as
Vi =
1
n− 1
∑
j∈N
E
( ∑
l∈N∗i−j
bilxil −
∑
l∈N∗j−i
bjlxjl)
2
 =
1
n− 1
∑
j∈N
E
(1− ∑
l∈N∗i−j
bil)θ
2 + (
∑
l∈N∗j−i
bilηil −
∑
l∈N∗i−j
bjlηjl)
2

=
1−∑l∈N∗i−j bil
τσ
+
1
n− 1
∑
j∈N
E
( ∑
l∈N∗j−i
bilηil −
∑
l∈N∗i−j
bjlηjl)
2

This term measures the amount of coordination losses brought about
by the dispersion and incompleteness of information. In particular,
the first term measures the value of the information about θ when
trying to predict other people’s actions -as in Hellwig and Veldkamp
(2009)-. The second term measures the value of the reports of others
when trying to forecast other players’ actions. To see the monotonic-
ity, notice that Vi increases in the effort of other players, since higher
effort implies that learning the true value of θ becomes more infor-
mative about other players’ actions. This implies that if i and j are
not linked, their efforts are strategic complements. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.11. There are two possibilities. First
assume that no information is withheld. Then, assume for a contra-
diction that information revelation is perfect. Then, it must be the
case that every two individuals obtain the same amount of informa-
tion at time t∗i where t
∗
i is such that i takes the action. Notice that in
a pure strategy equilibrium t∗i is deterministic (in particular, it does
not depend on the realizations of the signals). Clearly, 1 should leave
in the same period as 2, since in the following period 1 will not re-
ceive new information2. However, at the period in which 2 leaves, if
optimal, he shall get at least one more signal. Hence, 1 is always less
informed than 2 and results in Proposition 3 apply.
It is also straightforward to see that every agent leaving at period
t = 1, 2... it is an equilibrium, provided sufficiently many signals are
obtained. In particular t¯ would be the minimum between the period
at which the value of two more signals to the most central agent is
lower than δ and n+1
2
.
To conclude, we show that withholding of information does not
change the results . First notice that withholding information to j for
less than t∗j periods is never optimal (i would just reduce his own in-
fluence on other players obtaining the same amount of information.)
2If the equilibrium involves mixed strategies, the strategy of player 1, condi-
tional on observing that player 2 left is to leave in the following period, but no
more information is revealed to him.
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Now, suppose that agent i conceals his information until period t∗j -
that is, the period at which j leaves, and assume that i and j have
access to the same information, then we show that i − 1 must have
access to less information than them. If i and j have access to the
same information and t = t∗j they both leave. Then, if i− 1 is to have
the same amount of information as them, it must be that he receives
a report of the same precision at period t∗j (or later), and then leave.
However, in the line, this requires that there exists another agent i−t∗j
who originated that report and now gets to i − 1. Now, if that is the
case, then at period t∗j , j must have received another report coming
from agent i− 1− t∗j , and thus, j has access to more information than
i. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.12 . The idea is similar as in Propo-
sition 2.11. Suppose the result does not hold. Then, there exists
j ∈ Ni(g) such that i can communicate truthfully with j. We know
that it must be the case that their residual variances are equal, and
thus they have received the same number of signals. Since i’s neigh-
borhood is a subset of that of j, this can happen if and only if in the
last round of communication whatever j learns also i does. Hence,
it must be that j i) does not receive information that was not held
by another agent in the neighborhood of i in the previous period and
ii) decides not to leave until he gets to that stage. If δ is sufficiently
large, he will leave before. If δ is sufficiently small, however, he will
stay until all information is received. Since this must happen for all
j ∈ Ni(g) in order for i to communicate truthfully, it must be the case,
that at time t∗i = t
∗
j for all j ∈ Ni(g), no new information arrives to the
neighborhood of i so that all information must be aggregated before
everyone leaves, thus establishing the claim. 
A.3. Proofs of Chapter 3
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.3. Suppose on the contrary that there exist
three types 1 < 2 < 3 such that a(1) = a(3) = a and a(2) = a′ 6= a
with d ≤ d′. Revealed preference implies that
(1 + a− d)2 − (1 + a′ − d′)2 ≤ (2 + a− d)2 − (2 + a′ − d′)2
(3 + a− d)2 − (3 + a′ − d′)2 ≤ (2 + a− d)2 − (2 + a′ − d′)2
Since this must hold for all 3 ∈supp(d) it must also hold for the
max { : d(a()) = d}. Since the decision is chosen optimally it must
hold that d < 3 + a, so the second line implies that 2 + a < d, which
implies that 1 + a < d. Hence, both agents have aligned preferences
and the reverse order is impossible. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.4. The proof is by induction, taking only the
positive set of types - the other one is symmetric. It is well-known
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that in this class of partition equilibria, the boundaries of each inter-
val must satisfy an indifference condition between the two limiting
intervals. Since zero types are not biased, in any equilibrium they
must be able to truthfully reveal their type. Let 0 ∈ (l, l+1), so that
0 ∈ (al, al+1). Let ζl = E [ |  ∈ (l, l+1)]. Notice that l+1 must satisfy
(A.4) (l+1 − λζl)2 = (l+1 + al+1 − λ(ζl+1 + al+1)2 + c(al+1)
which requires λal+1 < λζl − λζl+1, al+1 < 0. But then either (l+1 −
λζl)
2 < (l+1 + al+1 − λ(ζl+1 + al+1))2, so that (A.4) cannot hold; or
there exists a type 0 <  < l+1, such that  + al+1 > λ(ζl+1 + al+1),
who prefers al+1 to 0. Hence λ(ζl+1 + al+1) = E(di(al)) > 0.
Now, suppose that E(di(ak+1)) > E(di(ak)), for all k ≥ l. Then
we show, that E(di(ak+2)) > E(di(ak+1)). Notice for a contradiction,
that by a similar argument if the relation were not to hold, it must be
that ak+2 < ak+1. Because K+1 is indifferent between ak+1 and ak, it
cannot be that he prefers ak+2 to one of them. In particular, he cannot
prefer ak+2 to ak+1. It follows that c(ak+2) > c(ak+1), so that ak+2 < 0.
But then, either k+2 prefers ak+1, since the action is cheaper and the
decision is closer, or if the decision is further away, it must be that
k+1 prefers ak+2 to ak+1. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.6. First notice that if the equilibrium
did not involve perfect separation of types, the principal can be made
(weakly) better-off by replicating the equilibrium choosing to observe
all the actions that belonged to the support of the equilibrium strategy
and pool the rest. If the equilibrium entails full separation, consider
the following perturbation.
E(a | m(a)) = a if a ∈ A \ (−a′, a′)
= E(a | a ∈ (−a′, 0)) if a ∈ (−a′, 0)
= E(a | a ∈ (0, a′)) if a ∈ (0, a′)
Notice that if ai ∈ (−a′, 0), and if a∗() is invertible
di(m(ai),m(a−i)) = χk + λ
∑
i6=j
E(θ−i | a−i)
where χk = 1F (a∗−1(a′))−F (a∗−1(0))
∫ a∗−1(ak+1)
a∗−1(ak)
(ε+ a()) dF (ε). Suppose
λc > 1. Then we have that
a() =

a′ + µ∗(− a−1(a′)) for almost all  ∈ (−¯, a−1(a′))
min {0, α + β} for almost all  ∈ (a−1(a′), 0)
max {0,−α + β} for almost all  ∈ (0, a−1(−a′))
a′ + µ∗(− a−1(−a′)) otherwise
with β = − 1
1+c
and α uniquely determined by maximization condi-
tions. Hence, the only choice is a′. Notice that for such a scheme to
be optimal
|a′| < ∣∣µ∗a−1(a′)∣∣ = −µ∗1
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Further, the agent with type 1 must be indifferent between pooling
or revealing. Hence
c (a′)2 + E
[
(1 + a
′ − d(a′))2] = c(min {0, α + β1})2 +
+E
[
(1 + min {0, α + β1} − d(m(min {0, α + β1})))2
]
equivalent to
c (a′)2 + E
[
(1 + a
′ − d(a′))2] = c(α + β1)2 +
+E
[
(1 + α + β1 − d(m(α + β1)))2
]
given |a′| < −µ∗1, we need that there exists (1, δ(1)), with 1 < 0,
δ > 0, satisfying
c (−µ∗1)2 + E
[
(1 + µ
∗1 − d(µ∗1))2
]
= c(α + β1)
2 +
+E
[
(1 + α + β1 − d(m(α + β1)))2
]
+ δ
Using our bound for µ∗ whenever λc > 1. Righ-hand side becomes
RHS = cµ∗221 + 
2
1(1 + µ
∗)2 +
+E(d(µ∗1))2 − 21(1 + µ∗)E (d(µ∗1))
= 21(cµ
∗2 + (1 + µ∗)2λ2) + λ2E(
1
N
∑
(j + a(j))
2)
whereas Left-hand side becomes
LHS = cα2 + cβ21 + 2cαβ
2
1 + E
[
(α + (1 + β)1 − d(m(α + β1)))2
]
= cα2 + 2cαβ1 + cβ
221 + (α + (1 + β)1)
2 + (1− λ)χk + λ2E( 1
N − 1
∑
(j + a(j))
2)
So the last term cancels and
21(cµ
∗2+(1+µ∗)2λ2) ≥ cα2+2cαβ1+cβ221+(α+(1+β)1)2+[(1− λ)χk]2
Both terms are zero at zero and for 1 small enough, the derivative of
the LHS is the sum of a negative term and a term proportional to the
derivative of the square of the expectation of the type within some
range with respect to the upper bound. This derivative is bounded by
the bound. Hence, as long as
c(µ∗2 − β2) + (1 + µ∗)2λ2 > (1 + β)2 + (1− λ)2
which happens for λ big enough, cλ > 1, you can take a(1) < µ1 and
that is independent of F (1). Hence, as long as 1 is small enough,
if there exists a µ ∈ (β, µ∗), the perturbed partition involving pool-
ing for types close enough to zero but strictly positive improves (no-
tice that I’ve show feasibility (IC)). Now, to see that this is an im-
provement compared with the full information partition, observe that
losses come from a range with measure
[
F (1)− 12
]
, whereas gains
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come from a measure [1− F (1)]. Hence we have to choose 1 so as
to maximize
[1− F (1)] c(µ∗2 − µ2)1 −
[
F (1)− 1
2
]
L(1)
First Order Condition for maximization is
−f(1)
[
c(µ∗2 − µ2)1 + L(1)
]
+[1− F (1)]
[
c(µ∗2 − µ2) + 1c ∂µ
∂1
]
−
[
F (1)− 1
2
]
L′(1) = 0
Whenever 1 → 0 this is clearly positive since it becomes
1
2
c(µ∗2 − µ2) > 0

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.7. As before the analysis is made for
the case in which  > 0 being the other case equivalent. The proof
is by contradiction. Assume first that the result does not hold, then
there exist a triple of cutoffs {k−1, k, k+1}, with k+1 > k > k−1 > 0
and such that m(a) = mˆ for all a ∈ [a∗(k), a∗(k+1))and m(a) = a if
a ∈ [a∗(k−1), a∗(k)), where a∗() are the original equilibrium actions.
Now, take ˆ such that
ˆ = k−1 + (k+1 − k)
I offer a scheme that improves for the principal by setting
m(a) = mˆ for all a ∈ [a(k−1), a˜(ˆ))
and
m(a) = a for all a ∈ [a˜(ˆ), a˜(k+1))
where a˜() are the new equilibrium actions. Notice that, by construc-
tion and linearity of the best responses.
a˜(k+1) = a
∗(k+1)
Therefore we have
aFB() ≥ a˜() ≥ a∗(k+1)
for all  > 0, with the second inequality being strict for all  ∈
(k−1, k+1) . Finally notice that the amount of information is the same
in both cases, so that the mechanism is clearly an improvement. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.8. For the first part, suppose not. Then
there exists λ1 ≥ λ2 such that ∗(λ1) < ∗(λ2). There must be a k1 such
that
k1 = min
k
{ak(λ1) < ak(λ2)}
I show that the partition generated by substituting aˆk(λ1) = ak(λ2)
and leaving the rest unchanged improves upon the original partition.
Notice that, since it was optimal before, the marginal loss from worse
information equated the marginal gain from better actions at that
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point. Clearly, the marginal loss from worse information is lower
now, since the need for coordination is higher. Hence, all we have
to show is that the marginal gain from better actions is not smaller
whenever the coordination need is higher.
For the second part, the argument is similar, noticing that higher
variance means lower importance of small shocks, as compared to
big shocks and since the advantage of pooling up to type ∗ is propor-
tional to 1− F (∗), higher variance leads to ∗ being higher. 
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